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Chapter 1: Spies Before the War 
 
 
The Soviet Union and the United States have always had a complicated 
relationship. When the Bolshevik Revolution of 1921 brought the communist party to 
power in Russia, the United States government did not recognize the new regime. The 
communist ideologies of the newly established state did not line up well with the 
democratic ideals of the United States. These new communist principles threatened the 
strength of the American system, as labor disputes and the Great Depression gave citizens 
reason to question capitalism’s effectiveness. The fear of this system grew as the world 
progressed through the twentieth century when the Soviet Union shifted from ally to 
enemy in all but a few years.  
Although the two countries may not have seen eye to eye, the American 
government was not particularly concerned with the issues of Soviet Russia after it was 
founded in December of 1922. Although World War I had shown that the United States 
could hold its own on the international stage, it still had yet to develop into the dominant 
world power that it would become after the Second World War. Despite the political 
tension that was felt from both countries, the two maintained an economic relationship. 
For instance, during the late 1920s the Soviet Union was “America’s seventh-biggest 
customer and its largest foreign purchaser of industrial machinery.”1 After all, both 
countries were growing and trying to establish themselves as two of the most powerful 
nations in the world, and this economic tie helped both of them achieve this goal.  
                                                
1 Katherine Sibley, Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War, (Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 2004), 14.  
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Regardless of the economic relationship that was developing between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, there was still an obvious layer of distrust that both 
exhibited. As John F. Fox explains, Vladimir Lenin was very concerned about the status 
of Soviet intelligence in the United States in the early 1920s.2 However, the American 
counterintelligence efforts in the 1920s and 1930s were very limited and basically 
inactive until the latter half of the thirties. Therefore, Soviet spy networks started to 
develop under the noses of U.S. officers. As Historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey 
Klehr explain in their book Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America “Soviet 
success, in other words, was not due solely to KGB skill, but also benefited from 
American incompetence and indifference.”3  The Soviets spies usually consisted of 
Americans who were either sympathetic to the communist cause or who needed money. 
Soviet spying began in the late twenties and continued on throughout the majority of the 
twentieth century. However, the spies that gave information before World War II usually 
gave over information for ideological reasons. 
The Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) was created after the Soviet 
Revolution and many of the Americans that spied for ideological reasons got their start 
within this organization. The Party went through many changes and compromises at the 
beginning of its inception. In 1920, the Party was divided between two parties, the 
CPUSA and the Communist Labor Party. Due to the infighting between these factions, 
the Communist International (Comintern) stepped in and forced the groups to merge.4 
                                                
2 John F. Fox, “What Spiders Did: US and Soviet Counterintelligence before the Cold War,” 
(Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 11, Number 3: The MIT Press, 2009), 207. 
3 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the 
KGB in America, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 484. 
4 James G. Ryan, "Socialist Triumph as a Family Value: Earl Browder and Soviet Espionage," 
American Communist History 1, no. 2 (December 2002). 
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Despite the early struggles between factions of the Party, it continued to develop and 
created a strong illegal wing when Earl Browder became its General Secretary in 1932.   
 The Soviet spy networks that developed before the Second World War were not 
as extensive as they would be during the war years. However, they did collect some 
valuable information on machinery and about the American perspective on other 
countries. 5  The AMTORG Trading Company covered for Soviet espionage, which 
allowed their American spies to collect valuable information on industry, such as details 
on Ford and other significant manufacturers of the time.6  AMTORG not only provided 
crucial intelligence back to the Soviet Union, but it also became a hub for new agents like 
Gaik Ovakimian, Harold Glasser, and Jacob Golos.  
In addition, many other networks developed through the Communist Party of the 
United States, like the one Whittaker Chambers was involved in. However, this cycle 
eventually broke when Chambers confessed to being a Soviet spy to the FBI in the late 
1930s. Another network was centered on Soviet agent, and GRU leader, Alfred Tilton, 
whose apparatus included important men like Nicolas Dozenberg and Earl Browder. A 
similar agent, named Ludwig Lore, also recruited various agents to work for branches of 
Soviet intelligence during the twenties and thirties. However, despite their years of 
service, and whether they were involved with the CPUSA or not, many of these Soviet 
spies died or were arrested during Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s.7 Nevertheless, while 
there was a myriad of Soviet spies that tried to provide information back to the USSR 
                                                
5 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 484. Fox, 209. 
6 Henry L. Zelchenko, “Stealing America’s Know-How: The Story of AMTORG” in The 
American Mercury, February 1952, 75-84. 
 
7 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 198.  
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during this time period, the majority of significant Soviet espionage occurred during and 
after World War II.  
 
One of the most significant early forms of Soviet espionage started with the 
AMTORG Trading Company. Ironically, this first major base for covert Soviet relations 
happened because the Soviet Union was not recognized by the United States and 
therefore did not have an embassy before 1933. Therefore, Amtorg became the hub for 
many Soviet operations and thousands of Russians entered America between 1924 and 
1930 with the help of this company.8 In his piece “Stealing America’s Know-How: The 
Story of AMTORG,” Henry Zelchenko describes how he was enlisted and then worked 
for Amtorg. When Ivan A. Likhachov approached Zelchenko during the early 1930s, 
Zelchenko did not know of what use he could be to Likhachov.9 However, he quickly 
learned that Amtorg was trying to recruit as many suitable agents as they could to gain 
information on American industry, thus helping the Soviet Union catch up to America’s 
performance.10 Zelchenko explained Amtorg’s month-long processes of exploring and 
collecting data on different commercial industries through visits to their headquarters.11 
Amtorg targeted many US companies, like Buick and TOCCO, and eventually the 
Russians were able to see the reward.12 As Zelchenko notes, “all the data that had been 
collected, studied and perfected by an American company through years of trial and error 
and at heavy cost the Russians were to obtain free, wrapped up in a neat package.”13 
                                                
8 Sibley, 15. 
9 Zelchenko, 76. 
10 Zelchenko, 77. 
11 Zelchenko, 79. 
12 Zelchenko, 79. 
13 Zelchenko, 80. 
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 Nevertheless, obtaining this industrial knowledge was not the whole of Amtorg’s 
purpose. Zelchenko concludes his paper by explaining the other functions that the 
company provided to both the Communist Party and the Soviet cause in general.  Amtorg 
not only gave funds to the Party, but they also functioned as the main cover for spies 
from the Soviet government.14 In addition, Zelchenko finishes by explaining that the 
Soviet “industrial progress rests on imitation of foreign achievements. Without a ready 
and continuous influx of American and other foreign machines and technical knowledge, 
Soviet industry would quickly become sterile.”15 During the 1930s the Soviet Union was 
in the midst of a major industrialization movement, which explains their focus on 
American industrial knowledge. Furthermore, this flow of information would certainly be 
helpful to the Soviet cause in years to come, as their espionage allowed them to build an 
atomic bomb in a much shorter time then they would have been able to without spying on 
the American efforts.  
 Amtorg was one of the primary vehicles for Soviet espionage in the early period 
before World War II. However, it did garner a lot of suspicion from various different 
American sources. For example, the New York Police Commissioner inquired about the 
real objectives of Amtorg. In 1930, Grover Whalen led an investigation because he 
believed the company was “harboring thirty undercover agents of the Communist 
International.”16 Unfortunately, Amtorg escaped this questioning without ramifications 
and continued to bring in Soviet agents and collect information on American products.17 
                                                
14 Zelchenko, 84. 
15 Zelchenko, 84. 
16 Sibley, 18. 
17 Sibley, 18. 
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 One of the most significant acts of espionage for Amtorg was not what they 
collected, but whom they covered for. In 1933, Gaik Ovakimian came to the United 
States under the cover of an Amtorg engineer, but was really the deputy head of the 
NKVD’s (the Soviet Union’s secret police) scientific-technical intelligence section.18 
Ovakimian is immensely significant not only because of the information he brought in, 
but also because of the Americans that he recruited to be Soviet spies. For example, 
Ovakimian recruited Jacob Golos who would be in charge of some of the most important 
spies, such as the Rosenberg ring, during World War II.19 Furthermore, Ovakimian 
recruited “an impressive array of technical and industrial informants in the chemical 
industry,” like Thomas Lessing Black, who began in the mid-1930s and was an important 
agent during the war years when he worked as a chemist.20 Another important asset that 
Ovakimian recruited was Harold Glasser in the later part of the 1930s.  
 Glasser joined the Justice Department in 1935. He was very effective spy because 
he had access to “Justice Department files (including those of the FBI) but also to reports 
from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.”21 Glasser’s position 
allowed him to not only report on issues of foreign intelligence, but it also enabled him to 
warn the KGB when the FBI was going to investigate fellow spy Jacob Golos and his 
network, the World Tourists.22 This was especially important because the World Tourists 
were such a valuable faction of Soviet espionage. The World Tourists worked with both 
Amtorg and the CPUSA to help Soviet agents enter into the United States by providing 
                                                
18 Haynes, Klehr, 151. 
19 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 504. 
20 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 489; Haynes and Klehr, 277. 
21 Harynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 201. 
22 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 203. 
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them with fake passports and deceitful travel information.23 Golos was the primary owner 
of the organization, which made him a lot of money until he, as well as the World 
Tourists, were brought under investigation by the FBI in 1940.24 Thankfully Glasser 
warned the Soviet system of this investigation and the organization was able to change its 
tune in time to only receive “a slap on the wrist.”25 Despite his hard work, Glasser’s 
service was suspended in 1938 by the Soviet Union when his main contact, Armand 
Feldman, disappeared and presumably defected.26 Unfortunately for both the Soviets and 
Glasser, their suspicions were correct. Feldman went to Canada to escape his former 
colleagues, but was too apprehensive about returning to the United States to testify.27 
Therefore, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police brought Feldman back to America in 
1940 where he was forced to testify.28  However, Feldman played down Glasser’s 
involvement and Glasser was able to escape the investigation only having lost his job.29  
Ovakimian was a successful station chief because he was able to recruit 
Americans who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union into working for Soviet 
intelligence. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr explain how in 1936 Richard Briggs 
“approached Amtorg about obtaining a position in the Soviet Union and met Ovakimyan. 
Just like with Thomas Black, Ovakimyan soon converted the job seeker into an industrial 
spy [sic].”30 Ovakimian was station chief until 1941 when the FBI arrested him after 
Feldman testified; however, at this point Ovakimian had been a very valuable asset to 
                                                
23 Haynes and Klehr, 95. 
24 Haynes and Klehr, 96. 
25 Haynes and Klehr, 96. 
26 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 203. 
27 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 205. 
28 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 205. 
29 Hayens, Klehr, Vassiliev, 205. 
30 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 378. 
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Soviet intelligence, allowing their covert network to grow into an effective machine that 
would function throughout World War II.   
 
Amtorg and Gaik Ovakimian were two of the most important Soviet intelligence 
assets during the pre-war era. However, they were not the only ones. Another very 
significant Soviet agent during the twenties and thirties was Alfred Tilton (or Tilden). 
Tilton was head of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency, for a time during the 
twenties. Tilton and his wife worked in the United States from 1927 to 1930, where they 
operated using “bootlegged passports” as they did not have any diplomatic support at this 
time (since the Soviet Union was still not recognized by the United States).31 Tilton not 
only procured these forms of false identification for himself, but he did so for other 
agents as well.32 While Tilton did provide some important information back to the Soviet 
government, like the lay out of the British warship Royal Oak, much of his more 
significant work came from his recruitment of valuable spies like Nicolas Dozenberg.33 
Before Tilton approached Dozenberg, he worked for the Communist newspaper 
Voice of Labor based in Chicago. He was a functionary for the CPUSA during the 1920s, 
but was unhappy about his level of pay and approached the Party for help.34 Dozenberg 
met Tilton under the auspices of his false name, Joseph Paquett, where he received his 
first assignment.35 This first assignment seemed quite reasonable to Dozenberg. As 
Theodore Draper explains in his book American Communism and Soviet Russia, 
“according to Dozenberg, his first assignment seemed innocent enough – to interview 
                                                
31 Sibley, 20. 
32 Sibley, 20. 
33 Sibley, 20. 
34 Draper, 211. 
35 Draper, 211. 
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people who could be sent to Soviet Russia for various purposes and to report on them to 
Tilton.”36 He was paid an increased stipend for this work, but claimed he was unaware 
that this qualified as espionage. 37  Nevertheless, in late 1927 Nicolas Dozenberg 
disappeared and a new identity, “Nicolas L. Dallant,” was created. As Draper confirms, 
Dallant was probably the “first American Communist to make the transition to Soviet 
military intelligence. Tilton, however, was probably not the first Soviet intelligence agent 
in the United States.”38 Dozenberg worked mostly in recruiting more agents and setting 
up their cover stories in the United States. When asked why he decided to engage in this 
type of work his response was complex, yet many other agents most likely felt the same 
way. Dozenberg explained that it was “partly convictions, and partly once you run into a 
game of that sort, well, it becomes so regular that you don’t pay any attention to it…”39 
So, while his participation as a spy was spurred by his need for money, it was maintained 
because of his sympathy for communism.  
Nevertheless, Dozenberg’s involvement in Soviet espionage was not without 
consequence. The FBI arrested Dozenberg in September 1939 after Benjamin Gitlow 
provided his name in testimony to the House of Representatives’ Special Committee on 
Un-American Activities.40  Gitlow was a former socialist who became an anti-communist 
at the end of the 1930s and provided information to HUAC as a result.41 Martin Dies, the 
head of HUAC, questioned Dozenberg in an attempt to gauge a better understanding of 
what Dozenberg did and whom else he was connected to. Dies asked Dozenberg about 
                                                
36 Draper, 211. 
37 Draper, 211. 
38 Draper, 211. 
39 Draper, 212. 
40 Draper, 212. 
41 Draper, 212. 
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Tilton and other agents like Jay Lovestone and Earl Browder for whom he had provided 
false identification.42 Dozenberg confirmed that he worked with Tilton and that the two 
had set up a shipping company that would “serve the purpose of shipping whatever 
material the people here had gathered.”43 Dozenberg confirmed his involvement with 
many different Soviet spies and helped Martin Dies understand Alfred Tilton’s network. 
Dozenberg went to prison for a year and a day because of his passport fraud and then 
returned to the Soviet Union.44 While Dozenberg was able to make it out with only one 
year of prison, his primary contact was not as lucky. Alfred Tilton was recalled to Russia 
in 1930 and was arrested in 1937 during Stalin’s Great Terror. Tilton served fifteen years 
in the Gulag (Russian prison/concentration camps) where he died of starvation and other 
circumstances in 1942.45 Tilton would not be the only Soviet agent to suffer this fate, as 
Stalin became increasingly paranoid about agents who had spent any time working 
overseas, especially in the West.  
 
The Communist Party of the United States fostered the recruitment and 
development of many Americans working as Soviet spies during the 1920s and especially 
the 1930s. The CPUSA had a troubled beginning as it worked to establish itself and set 
its goals. During late 1919 the Party functioned legally as it worked to gain more 
supporters who believed that a Revolution could happen in the United States as it had in 
the Soviet Union.46 However, as time went on bombings and other threats forced the 
                                                
42 Draper, 212. 
43 House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities. Tuesday, 
May 21, 1940. Washington, D.C. 578. 
44 Draper, 213. 
45 Sibley, 21. 
46 Haynes and Klehr, 57. 
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Party to go underground.47 Leadership was passed around for another couple of years 
until the Communist International (the Soviet organization that oversaw the Communist 
parties of the world) told them to return to the legal sphere and establish themselves as a 
legitimate Party.48 Throughout the 1920s the CPUSA functioned legally, while it tried to 
develop its Secret wing. As Haynes and Klehr discuss in their book Venona, “during the 
1920s the American party had an underground, but, distracted as it was by its vicious 
internal factional battles, its covert apparatus was not carefully maintained.”49 The 
CPUSA’s undercover section would not function well until the 1930s when Josef Peters 
led the secret faction.  
Josef Peters (whose real name was Alexander Stevens) was a Hungarian born 
communist who moved to the United States in 1924.50 Peters joined the CPUSA when he 
arrived and was quickly became involved in the factional disputes of the Party. Peters 
was a follower of the very controversial Jay Lovestone who was a supporter of Nikolai 
Bukharin. Bukharin was at one point one of Stalin’s greatest allies; however, he was 
purged from Soviet leadership in 1929. This led to Lovestone’s, along with other 
minority faction’s, expulsion from the Party. 51  However, after the CPUSA was 
“cleansed” of these smaller groups, it was able to grow because of its singular beliefs. In 
1930, Peters was promoted to “organizational secretary of the New York Communist 
Party, the CPUSA’s largest regional unit.”52  Peters reported to Earl Browder, the 
CPUSA’s General Secretary, where they worked together to develop an effective 
                                                
47 Haynes and Klehr, 57. 
48 Haynes and Klehr, 58. 
49 Haynes and Klehr, 60. 
50 Haynes and Klehr, 61. 
51Haynes and Klehr, 61. 
52 Haynes and Klehr, 61. 
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espionage unit within the Party. Peters was responsible for “detecting surveillance by 
hostile police, exposing infiltrators, and protecting special party assets, such as sensitive 
records, from seizure.”53 Despite all of these significant duties, one of the most important 
jobs of Peters was to facilitate communication between the underground and different 
covert groups working within Washington.  
When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the New Deal, he believed 
that it would help the American people recover from the Great Depression; however, it 
unwittingly also became a system through which Soviet espionage networks were 
developed. The Agricultural Adjustment Agency (AAA) was one of the programs that 
FDR created as a way to help rebuild the agricultural sector of States. While this did 
occur, it also provided some Soviet agents with a gateway into US information. These 
agents had to break with the Communist Party when they got involved in the government 
or else they would be discharged.54 Nevertheless, the Party maintained an important role 
in their espionage, as the CPUSA facilitated many of the relationships that agents had 
when working for these government agencies. For example, Harold Ware and his group 
of Soviet spies developed through the AAA and his work with the CPUSA.55 J. Peters 
introduced Ware to Whittaker Chambers in 1934, whose network already included 
seventy-five other agents working within the government.56 Some of the most notorious 
alleged spies of the Ware group were Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, John Abt, Charles 
Kramer, Nathan Witt, Henry Collins, George Silverman, Donald Hiss, and Victor Perlo.57 
However, Harold Ware died in 1935 and Earl Browder took over his contacts. This group 
                                                
53 Haynes and Klehr, 61. 
54 Haynes and Klehr, 62. 
55 Haynes and Klehr, 62. 
56 Haynes and Klehr, 62. 
57 Haynes and Klehr, 62-63. 
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continued to collect information over the years, until one of their own came forward to 
the United States Government about their actions.  
 One of the most notorious Soviet spies of the era before World War II became 
famous of his own accord. In 1938, Whittaker Chambers defected from the communist 
cause and provided information to the American government on Soviet intelligence. In 
1952, Chambers published his book Witness that told the story of his involvement both 
within the Communist Party and communist underground. On page 201, Chambers 
describes his induction into the CPUSA in 1925. He had decided that he wanted to join 
and was approached by what he called a “glassy-eyed communist” who questioned him 
briefly about why he wanted membership.58 Chambers explained that he “believed that 
Communism was the answer to the social crisis and that [he] wanted to do something 
about it.”59 After reading a couple of recommended communist writings, Chambers 
became an official party member. Chambers was active in the Communist Party and 
wrote for and edited for two popular communist papers titled New Masses and The Daily 
Worker. Chambers played an important role in the CPUSA, but was approached seven 
years later for a new opportunity in the same cause. 
 Chambers recalls the experience of being approached for his new job in his book 
Witness. Comrade Bedacht called Chambers in to have a meeting with him about what 
his new possible role would be. Chambers recollects his initial meeting with Bedacht as a 
little disconcerting:  
“For some reason,” he said, as if he strongly disapproved of the whole 
business, “they want you to go into one of the party’s ‘special 
                                                
58 Chambers, 201. 
59 Chambers, 201. 
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institutions.’” Bedacht always used that expression in referring to any of 
the Communist underground apparatuses. But it was a term new to me.60 
 
Chambers acknowledged how hesitant Bedacht was to offer him this position, but 
Chambers himself was also nervous about this new offer and initially declined. 
Nevertheless, as Chambers further explains, he had no choice in the matter; if he decided 
to refuse the offer he would be expelled from the Party.61 Thus Chambers joined the 
Soviet underground in 1931 where he worked secretly for seven years until he turned 
himself in to the FBI.  
Chambers was an important agent for the Soviets as he was not only involved in 
military, but also political espionage. Chambers was responsible for gaining access to and 
reporting back to the Soviet Union on companies like Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey 
and the Electric Boat Company in Connecticut.62 Chamber’s political espionage took 
place at the Agricultural Adjustment Agency, where he worked to gain information with 
other Soviet agents such as “Julian Wadleigh at the Department of Agriculture, Ward 
Pigman at the Bureau of Standards, Alger Hiss, then a liaison to the Senate’s Nye 
Committee, and Harry Dexter White at the Treasury Department.”63 While Chambers 
was involved in Soviet espionage he functioned as a very valuable asset in their system. 
However, Chambers became anxious during the late half of the thirties when Stalin’s 
Great Terror began and ultimately decided to leave the Communist party and go into 
hiding with his family. Almost a decade later Chambers testified against other agents that 
he had previously worked with in the Soviet espionage system. 
                                                
60 Chambers, 275. 
61 Chambers, 279. 
62 Sibley, 32. 
63 Sibley, 33. 
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Chamber’s testimony implicated the rest of the Ware group in spying for the 
Soviet Union. While many of these spies confirmed his allegations, Alger Hiss 
maintained his innocence. After Chambers accused Hiss of being in contact with him and 
thus committing espionage for the Soviet Union, Hiss sent a telegram to the House of Un-
American Activities Committee stating: 
 “I DO NOT KNOW MR. CHAMBERS AND, SO FAR AS I AM 
AWARE, HAVE NEVER LAID EYES ON HIM.  THERE IS NO BASIS 
FOR THE STATEMENTS ABOUT ME MADE TO YOUR 
COMMITTEE....I WOULD FURTHER APPRECIATE THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF APPEARING BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE...”64 
 
However, this only made Chambers continue to provide information on his relationship 
with Hiss and his wife. Hiss charged Chambers with a slander suit, but Chambers 
responded by providing HUAC with documents of correspondence between himself and 
Hiss.65 Unfortunately for Hiss, Chambers evidence against him did not end there. 
Nicknamed “the pumpkin papers” by the media, Chambers brought HUAC investigators 
to his farm where he revealed his possession of film that incriminated Hiss with perjury 
inside of a hollowed out pumpkin.  
 Despite all of Chambers’ evidence, Hiss was unable to be convicted of espionage 
because the statue of limitations for espionage was only five years and the evidence that 
was presented was ten years old.66 Nevertheless, Hiss was tried for perjuring himself in 
court and served forty-four months of a five-year sentence for his crimes.67 Even though 
Hiss was not convicted for espionage, the publicity of his trial made him one of the first 
and most notorious Americans accused of spying for the Soviet Union.  
                                                
64 Doug Linder, “The Trials of Alger Hiss: A Commentary,” 2003, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/hissaccount.html.  
65 Linder, “The Trials of Alger Hiss: A Commentary.” 
66 Linder, “The Trials of Alger Hiss: A Commentary.” 
67 Linder, “The Trials of Alger Hiss: A Commentary.” 
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 
 Joseph Stalin’s leadership within the Soviet Union was extremely harsh. He 
molded the communist ideals of the Soviet Revolution into an autocratic society that he 
ruled. He battled the constant paranoia that those closest to him would try to overthrow 
his regime, and throughout his tenure in office he carried out many purges of Soviet 
government officials.  Alfred Tilton was one of the spies that suffered the consequence of 
Stalin’s delusions. As John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr explain in their book Spies: 
The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, “The terror Stalin unleashed in the USSR 
beginning in 1934 consumed much of the leadership and large portions of the rank-and-
file of the Soviet Communist Party. The KGB was both its chief instrument and one of its 
major victims.”68  
Juliet Stuart Poyntz was another one of the Soviet agents that suffered this 
unfortunate fate. Poyntz was a member of both the Daughters of the Revolution and was 
a founding member of the Communist Party of the United States.69 Poyntz sought out 
secret intelligence work and in 1934 she stopped working for the CPUSA and started to 
work for the OGPU (the Soviet military secret police). Poyntz’s fellow colleague and 
friend, Benjamin Gitlow, described what happened to Juliet in his 1948 book The Whole 
of Their Lives. Poyntz was an accomplished spy: she collected details about “scientific 
information in the United States in the fields of chemistry and physics, which the OGPU 
considered of great importance to the industrial and military strength of Russia.”70 
Despite her success, Poyntz was not going to escape Stalin’s purges. Gitlow described 
how Poyntz’ good friend and former lover, Shachno Epstein, led her to her death out of 
                                                
68 Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, 490. 
69 Gitlow, 331. 
70 Gitlow, 332. 
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fear of what would happen to him if he chose not to.71 Rumors had started that Poyntz 
was writing about her experiences as a spy and might defect, so Stalin and his associates 
decided to take action.72 
 Epstein and Poyntz went on a walk together through Central Park where she was 
grabbed and thrown into a car.73 Gitlow retells how the Soviet agent had killed her in a 
disturbingly detailed fashion,  
how they had driven her up through Westchester into Dutchess County to 
some woods not far from the Roosevelt estate – how the pleading, crying, 
frantic girl was killed and buried in a deep gully. The body was covered 
with lime and dirt. On top were placed dead leaves and branches, which 
the three killers trampled down with their feet. He ended his story: “Ah, 
she was too beautiful, comrades. Too bad we had to kill her.”74 
 
This terrifying story epitomizes the brutality with which Stalin conducted his purges. 
Unfortunately for himself, he destroyed many of the intelligence networks that he had 
developed before World War II. Not all of the agents were purged, but there would have 
to be a significant rebuilding of the espionage systems so that the Soviets could have 
coherent and effective information provided to them during and after the war. 
 The 1920s and 1930s was an era of careless American counterintelligence, which 
allowed for Soviet espionage efforts to expand. This paved the way for many spies, like 
Thomas Lessing Black and Harry Gold, to continue to work well into World War II after 
getting their start in espionage during the thirties. The 1930s were a time when the Soviet 
Union gained valuable information on industrial progress that was being made by the 
                                                
71 Gitlow, 334. 
72 Gitlow, 334. 
73 Gitlow, 335. 
74 Gitlow, 335. 
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United States, which in turn helped it develop its aircraft, electronics, and chemical 
know-how during Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan.75  
Chapter 2: The Wartime Spies 
 
 
World War II started in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland and for the next 
six years many countries were engulfed in heated battle. The United States joined the war 
effort in 1941 on the side of the Allies (England and the Soviet Union) in an effort to 
defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan. However, while the United States and the British were 
partners with the Soviet Union, they also did not always agree on everything. Throughout 
the war the Soviet Union had intelligence officers working within the United States and 
Britain collecting data on classified information. These spies gathered industrial, 
technological, and chemical knowledge that pushed their progress forward. 
Nevertheless, some of the most important intelligence was stolen from a project 
that the American people did not even know of. The Manhattan Project was an initiative 
to create a bomb that could destroy a whole city at once. The construction of the bomb 
took place in the United States and was backed by its allies, Britain and Canada. 
However, ever since two of these bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagaski, foreign affairs have never been the same. Nevertheless, without 
the full knowledge of the devastation that an atomic bomb could create, both the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union pined for the chance to develop a weapon like this first. Therefore, the 
Soviet Union employed scientists, Soviet agents, and members of the Communist Party to 
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covertly obtain intelligence of the bomb from the Manhattan Project, which allowed them 
to complete their bomb years earlier than they would have been able to previously.76  
Many of the agents that were gathering information from the United States were 
effective at remaining anonymous during their tenure working as a spy for the USSR. 
While some of the main spy rings were dissolved because agents chose to defect back to 
the United States, others were cracked open through the relentless work of those who 
deciphered the cables between Moscow and its New York Station. This initiative was 
named the Venona Project and it gave the United States counterintelligence network 
many clues as to what it was doing wrong. While the U.S. government was aware of what 
these cables said they did not release them to the public until 1995 (only a few years after 
the communist regime collapsed). It is through these cables that we are now able to see 
how the Soviet government infiltrated the work of these top secret U.S. agencies, which 
ultimately gave the USSR information that would shape how international affairs were 
conducted during the Cold War.  
 
One of the most important Soviet agents during World War II actually started his 
espionage work before the conflict erupted. Jacob Golos (briefly mentioned in Chapter 1) 
was a Ukrainian born immigrant to the United States, who became a naturalized citizen in 
1915. From an early age Golos sympathized with leftist policies and joined the 
Communist Party of America in 1919.77 In that same year Golos left the United States 
and went to Russia for four years, until he returned to the United States and started to 
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work with the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).78 When he started 
working for the Party he wrote for the Russian-language journals Novy Mir, but it would 
not be long until he was promoted to chief administrator for the Society for Technical 
Aid to Soviet Russia.79 Nevertheless, Golos’ most important work for the Soviet Union 
was still yet to come.  
In June of 1927 Jacob Golos (codenamed ‘Sound’) became the chief official of 
the new travel agency, the World Tourists.  The World Tourists worked with the CPUSA 
to help with the international travel of Soviet agents from the USSR to the United States 
(or vice versa) by providing falsified travel documents and identification.80 However, like 
many other pre-war Soviet agents, Golos was almost purged during the late 1930s. He 
was asked to return back to the Soviet Union, but evaded their requests and actually 
ended up building up his networks instead.81 Golos expanded the World Tourists by 
creating “the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation, a party- and Soviet-funded cover 
agency with the ‘ostensible business purpose’ of sending packages to Russia.”82 Through 
this system, Golos ran some of the most important Soviet espionage networks of his time. 
For example, Golos ran notable spy networks like the Rosenberg Network, the Perlo 
Group, and the Silvermaster Network.83 However, Golos gave up his control of the 
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Rosenberg network to Soviet agent, Sergey Semonov, at the urging of his Soviet 
handlers, but would remain unwavering about his other networks.84  
Golos kept his affiliation with the CPUSA during his tenure working within 
Soviet espionage. This was a risky situation, as many agents broke ties with the Party so 
that they would not come under suspicion by American intelligence. Nevertheless, Golos 
was a very important source for the Soviets and it was partly because of his connections 
within the CPUSA that he was so successful. As Harvey Klehr explains in his book Spies,  
From 1941 until 1945 Golos and the CPUSA provided the KGB with its 
most valuable political, diplomatic, military, and technical intelligence 
sources. The relationship was fraught with difficulties and tensions, and 
the KGB was always aware that its reliance on party-based networks 
might result in catastrophe. In the short, run the risk paid off, and the years 
from 1942 to 1945 were a golden age for the KGB. But later there was a 
price to be paid.85 
 
Although Golos gave the Soviet Union some of its most valuable spies, especially about 
the atomic bomb, he would not live to see his work completely pay off. Golos died in 
1943, which left his networks in the hands of his courier Elizabeth Bentley. 
Elizabeth Bentley was an American born communist who graduated from Vassar 
College and got her masters degree from Columbia University. She joined the CPUSA in 
1935 and within a few years she would be working for the communist underground.  Her 
first job was at the Italian Library of Information, but the information she had available to 
her was not of much interest to her sources. 86 Nevertheless, it was at this job that Bentley 
would first meet Golos. The two had a much more complicated relationship than just that 
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of informant and boss – the two were also involved romantically.87 Bentley was promoted 
to Golos’ assistant in 1939, in which she would act as a courier for his sources.88 The 
relationship between the two explains why Bentley was so protective over Golos’ 
networks after his death in 1943.  
Bentley helped run both the Perlo Group and the Silvermaster network, and was 
extremely reluctant to hand over her contacts after Golos death. Soviet agent Vasily 
Zarubin wanted to take over her spies and give control of them to Soviet agent Iskhak 
Akhmerov. However, Bentley proved to be determined and “continued to throw up 
obstacles” when Zarubin tried to set up meetings with the American agents in her 
networks.89  Akhmerov believed that Bentley was losing a bit of control and was very 
eager for her to turn over her sources to Soviet leadership. In 1944, he reported on the 
contradictions in her personality and how her mood could change in an instant.90 As her 
biographer explains, she was unstable after the passing of Golos and was “depressed, 
drinking excessively, and pursuing lovers of both sexes.”91 However, she eventually 
turned over the Silvermaster network in 1944. At that point she was given another 
handler, Anatoli Borisovich Gromov, who attempted to lure her back to the Soviet Union. 
Bentley was probably right in assuming that this trip to the Soviet Union would not end 
well, and she stayed in America. Bentley continued to receive pressure from her Soviet 
handlers to turn over her sources to their control, which is part of the reason that she 
ended up turning herself into the FBI in 1945. 
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Bentley had become very anxious and suspicious in the years after Golos’ death. 
Part of this was probably because of the fact that her Soviet handlers were trying to faze 
her out, as they had noticed the change in her personality. Furthermore, her networks 
were both extremely fragile and possibly volatile. All of her sources were old friends 
from the underground and had knowledge about each other’s activities with espionage; 
so, if one was caught, they were all caught.92 Bentley’s handlers were working hard to get 
her to hand over her sources, but she was “embittered, lonely, and a promiscuous 
alcoholic” who believed that the American government was coming for her.93 However, 
Bentley could not have been more incorrect. While the FBI was investigating the World 
Tourists, they had never really heard of Elizabeth Bentley and were unsure if they should 
believe her story when she first approached them. Nevertheless, Bentley’s story would 
actually check out with the Venona Project records once they were uncovered.  
Elizabeth Bentley defected from the Soviet cause on August 23, 1945.94 As a 
result of her defection, the Soviet Union had to recall its agents that had worked with 
Bentley: Anatoly Gorsky, Akhmerov (chief of the illegal station), and Vladimir Pravdin 
(chief of the New York Station).95 While Bentley had provided the Soviet Union with a 
considerable amount of secret intelligence during her work as a spy, she would be equally 
as important to the United States in their counterintelligence efforts. Bentley’s reasoning 
for turning herself in was because of her growing disillusionment with communism.96  
She was a young idealist when she joined the American communist movement and 
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believed that communism would end discrimination.97 However, after Golos’ death 
Bentley understood where she stood within the Soviet network and believed it was time 
to go “back to being a good American.”98  
Bentley first went to the FBI office in New Haven, Connecticut to talk to an agent 
about her information. It took her about three separate meetings until on November 7, 
1945 the FBI conducted an eight-hour long interrogation in which “Bentley signed a 31-
page statement.”99 This investigation would go on for a few months, “resulting in a 107-
page final report naming more than eighty individuals.”100 Despite Bentley’s lack of hard 
evidence, much of what she said checked out with what former Soviet informant, 
Whittaker Chambers, said when he defected only a few months earlier in May of the 
same year. Bentley’s defection was a large set back in Soviet espionage efforts. The 
Americans found out that the Soviets knew about the “German battle plans, official 
American assessments of the Soviet-German front, secret policy discussions on Lend-
Lease trade, and currency issues, and even ‘the approximate scheduled date of D-Day.”101 
However, the American government could now monitor the networks that Bentley 
confessed to knowing about. Furthermore, her trial in 1948 created a wave of suspicion 
against any communist (or former communist) in the United States. 
Elizabeth Bentley helped work with two important networks of spies before she 
defected in 1945. Both the systems involved government employees and significant 
information being passed to the Soviet Union. One of the groups that Elizabeth Bentley 
came in contact with during her tenure as a Soviet spy was that of Victor Perlo. Born of 
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Russian immigrants, Perlo eventually attended Columbia and got a degree in 
Mathematics. By the late 1930s he was a prominent member of the communist 
underground and would be one of the main subjects in Elizabeth Bentley’s testimony 
after her defection to the FBI. In addition, Victor Perlo was an original member of the 
Ware Group, which was the group that Whittaker Chambers was a part of and testified 
against after his defection. Nevertheless, Perlo was also a successful economist outside of 
his work with the Soviet Union. By 1943 Perlo was a senior economist at the War 
Production Board and in 1945 he transferred to the Division of Monetary Research at the 
Treasury Department.  
Although Perlo was one of Bentley’s main victims in her testimony, she did not 
work with his secret apparatus until 1943. Up until 1943 the Perlo Group consisted of 
“mid-level government officials” that reported to the CPUSA.102 Earl Browder put Golos 
and Bentley in contact with the group before Golos’ death, but he was only able to meet 
with them once. Bentley took over Golos’ contacts after his passing, so she continued to 
meet with the Perlo Group in the future. However, Bentley was only an intermediary for 
the Perlo group as they transferred from reporting to CPUSA agents to reporting directly 
to Soviet agents. During Bentley’s first couple of meetings with the group, she got to 
meet all of the members. The Perlo Group consisted of John Abt, Perlo, Charles Kramer, 
Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, Donald Wheeler, and Allan Rosenberg. Many of 
these sources worked within the War Production Board or the Office of Strategic 
Services.103  
                                                
102 Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, 271. 
103 Sibley, 121. 
 27 
Despite Bentley’s involvement with the Perlo Group, she did not have much 
tangible evidence against them in her testimony. She never read the documents that the 
members passed along to her, so her concrete evidence was lacking. Nevertheless, she did 
recall a few facts. For example, “she remembered memoranda on aircraft production 
(from Perlo), OSS intelligence summaries and OSS copies of State Department cables 
(from Wheeler), and plans for the occupation of Germany (from Allan Rosenberg).”104 
Regardless of Bentley’s lack of solid information, more evidence would come out about 
the Perlo Group at later times that revealed what they had provided to the Soviet Union. 
Venona cables confirmed much of what Bentley said and further indicted Perlo. For 
example, the Venona cables revealed that  
Perlo supplied data on aircraft production and US shipments to various 
fronts and reports about development difficulties for a jet engine for 
America’s first and very secret jet fighter, as well as information on 
clashes between US military and civilian policy-makers over allocation of 
economic resources.105 
 
Other members of the Perlo apparatus collected valuable information on the international 
dealings of other countries. For example, Harold Glasser reported on both Nazi and 
Finnish dealings with the U.S. and with the Soviet Union.106 The Perlo Group committed 
espionage throughout World War II, but it was not until 1947 that the FBI decided to take 
action against them. Despite the fact that the FBI was convinced of the Perlo group’s 
guilt, the Bureau did not have enough solid evidence to convict them. Therefore, the FBI 
had the members of the Perlo apparatus fired or had their positions eliminated. This was 
all done quietly and none of the members were persecuted for their espionage. In spite of 
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their lack of conviction, evidence was later revealed through the USSR’s archives and the 
Venona records that prove this group of government employees was guilty of handing 
over secrets to the Soviet Union during war years.107  
The other espionage apparatus that the Golos-Bentley network worked with was 
that of Gregory Silvermaster. Silvermaster’s network was much like the Perlo group, 
however it provided more important information back to the Soviet Union. Gregory 
Silvermaster and his wife Helen ran the network, with the assistance of their friend 
William Ullman. It was first operated through the Golos and Bentley partnership starting 
in 1941, but by 1944 it had fully transferred over to Soviet control. The Silvermaster 
network included many important government officials, like “William Taylor, George 
Silverman, Frank Coe, William Gold, Sonia Gold, Irving Kaplan, Norman Bursler, 
Lauchlin Currie, Anatole Volkov, and Harry Dexter White.”108  
Gregory Silvermaster was an immigrant from the Soviet Union who had roots in 
the Communist Party. In 1919 he joined the Party in Seattle and continued to be 
outspoken about his views. Eventually he moved to California and met Earl Browder who 
brought him into working with the communist underground in 1934. Silvermaster was 
also a practiced government official, who had worked in a variety of departments, such as 
the Resettlement Administration, the Maritime Labor Board, the Farm Security 
Administration, and the Board of Economic Warfare. Ultimately Browder put Golos into 
contact with Silvermaster so that the two could expand covert work together in 
Washington.109 Silvermaster’s network reported to Golos and Bentley until 1944 when 
Silvermaster began reporting to Soviet agent Akhmerov. Silvermaster consistently came 
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under suspicion by curious government employees, but his connections within the 
government were strong enough that others within his secret network would bail him out 
if need be.  
Silvermaster’s importance to the Soviet cause cannot be understated. He not only 
collected information on his own, but he gathered secrets from his network that would 
prove very useful to the Soviet Union. The KGB not only awarded Silvermaster with a 
three thousand dollar bonus at the end of 1944, but they also awarded him with a medal 
because of his work for the USSR.110 Sixty-one Venona messages show that Silvermaster 
handed “over huge quantities of War Production Board data on weapons, aircraft, tank, 
artillery, and shipping production; Board of Economic Warfare documents on German 
industry and on American reserves of manpower, foodstuffs, and raw materials…” to 
name a shortened list of all he collected.111 Silvermaster was one of the most crucial 
Soviet spies within the U.S. Government during the war period also because of the spies 
that worked for him.  
Silvermaster’s partner, William Ullman, was not only of great use to the U.S. 
government, but he was also a valuable asset to the Soviet government’s underground. 
Ullman and the Silvermasters were not only business partners, but they were practically 
like family. Ullman met Gregory Silvermaster in 1935 when he started his job at the 
National Recovery Administration. However, by 1939 he was working under Harry 
Dexter White (another source in the Silvermaster network) in the Pentagon at the 
Treasury’s Division of Monetary Research. His immediate supervisor was another Soviet 
source, Frank Coe, to whom he delivered “highly coveted aircraft production 
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statistics.”112 Ullman was a resourceful spy, who not only delivered his own information, 
but also helped Silvermaster run his network. For example, while he lived with the 
Silvermasters he would photograph the copious amounts of documents that were to be 
transferred from sources to the USSR.  
Another source within the Silvermaster network was George Silverman. He was 
part of the communist underground starting in the 1930s and although he did not have a 
highly placed job within the U.S. government, his value to the Soviet cause came through 
his people skills. Silverman knew Whittaker Chambers through his espionage. Chambers 
explained how Silverman’s main job was to keep one of the most important Soviet 
sources in the U.S. Government, Harry Dexter White, cooperative with the communist 
agenda.113 In addition, Silverman was the Civilian Chief of Analysis and Plans in the 
Office of the Assistant Chief of the Army Air Force Air Staff for Material and Service, 
where he would provide the KGB with “reports on American aircraft production and 
allocation and on training and provisioning of air crews.”114 Despite this connection, he 
was still most vital because of his connection to Harry White and Lauchlin Currie.  
Harry Dexter White was one of the most important Soviet spies who was not 
involved in atomic espionage. Historians Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes describe 
White as the “most important member of the Silvermaster network and the most highly 
placed asset the Soviets possessed in the American government… as assistant secretary 
of the treasury.”115 White was a Lithuanian Jew whose family immigrated to the United 
States when he was young. He was a very intelligent and successful man, as he went to 
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Stanford and then got his PhD from Harvard. In the 1930s he joined the Treasury and 
continued to rise steadily through the ranks. By 1941 he was Assistant to the Secretary of 
the Treasury and by the end of the war he had become the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury. White had a profound impact on the U.S. economic perspective when he and 
John Maynard Keynes sculpted the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. By 1946 he had 
risen to one of the most important position in the U.S. Government: Director of the 
IMF.116  
White had an immeasurable impact on the American economic outlook during the 
war years. However, while White was working for the U.S. Government, he was 
simultaneously providing intelligence to the USSR. White began his contact with the 
Soviet Union in the middle of the 1930s when he reported to Whittaker Chambers and his 
GRU network. Chambers described his assistance to the cause “as more of a Soviet 
sympathizer than a disciplined CPUSA member, someone who cooperated with the party 
underground to the extent he wished but didn’t take orders.” 117  This style was 
characteristic of White’s service to the Soviet Union. In the 1940s he began reporting to 
the KGB through Silvermaster, but maintained this manner of espionage. Majority of 
White’s usefulness came with his connections in the government. He not only used his 
resources within the government to help pro-communist policies pass, like when he was a 
senior adviser to the American delegation at the founding of the United Nations, but he 
helped Soviet sources, like “Frank Coe, Harold Glasser, Ludgwig Ullmann, Victor Perlo, 
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Sonia Gold, Gregory Silvermaster, George Silverman, Irving Kaplan, William Taylor, 
and Solomon Adler,” get positions of influence at government jobs.118  
While White provided some valuable information to the Soviet cause, author R. 
Bruce Craig suggests that what White passed along never fully subverted U.S. policy.119 
Furthermore, White vehemently testified against Elizabeth Bentley after she accused him 
of espionage by giving an extremely pro-American speech that subverted her argument to 
many people.120 This largely cleared White of Bentley’s accusations in the eyes of the 
public. White’s friend and adviser at the end of the war also fought to clear White’s name 
in his book Foreign Adventures of an Economist. Ray Mikesell claimed that White did 
not fear communism and thus was not afraid to work with communist officials, but that 
he never engaged in covert operations.121 It is also a possibility that White was a blind 
source for the Soviets; meaning that while he did provide information to the Soviet 
Union, he did not realize that he was giving them valuable secrets.122 Despite all of this, 
historians Haynes and Klehr still argue that White was a participant in Soviet espionage, 
as his name comes up in more than two-dozen KGB cables. Nevertheless, White cut his 
contact with the KGB in 1945, after word of Bentley’s defection, and died only days after 
defending himself against her accusations in 1948.  
Another one of the sources that operated through Gregory Silvermaster was 
another high-ranking U.S. official, Lauchlin Currie. Currie was a Harvard graduate who 
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began working for the U.S. government in 1934. Currie and White knew each other when 
they both worked in the Treasury’s Division of Research and Statistics. By 1943 he was a 
“powerful figure in wartime Washington, both as a presidential aide and as an 
administrator of an agency.”123 Throughout his rise in power in Washington, Currie held 
ties to the communist underground. Whittaker Chambers claims that Currie held ties to 
the communists beginning in the 1930s. However, he explains that Currie was much like 
White in the way he conducted himself among these associates. He was extremely 
cautious and more or less cooperated with the cause by only providing a limited amount 
of information. As Whittaker Chambers explained, he “never went the full way.”124  
Nevertheless, Currie still delivered important documents to his communist links. 
For example, an “August 1943 New York KGB cable reports to Moscow that Currie had 
given Silverman a memorandum on a political subject, otherwise unspecified, that was 
either from or for the State Department.”125 The FBI, specifically its director Edgar 
Hoover, was curious as to where Currie’s allegiances actually laid. He brought the 
question to President Truman in 1945, but a deeper investigation did not happen. After 
Bentley’s testimony there was a much deeper interest in whether or not Currie was a full 
out spy for the Soviet Union. Currie lost his citizenship within the United States as a 
result of these speculations, and moved to Colombia with his wife in 1950 as a 
consequence.   
When analyzing the impact that both Currie and White had in terms of what they 
gave over to the Soviets, it is important to also understand the context of the time in 
which they were living. Julius Kobyakov, the deputy director of the KGB’s American 
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Division during the late 1980s, describes how the significance of what Currie and White 
did can be lost if not explained through their circumstances:  
I understand that Currie or [Harry Dexter] White, who were branded as 
subversives in the McCarthy era and stigmatised again by the VENONA 
cables, would hardly be considered heroes by the present day American 
historical establishment. But if a professional opinion is called for, as to 
whether those people were Soviet agents, my answer is no. It is easy to 
badmouth the people who no longer can defend themselves, and to 
overlook the fact that they in their own way may have helped the anti-
Hitler coalition to win the bloodiest war in history.126 
 
Currie and White believed that the information they were providing to their ally, the 
Soviet Union, would help defeat Hitler’s Nazi regime. Their intentions may not have 
been to subvert their own government, but to actually help them work with their political 
allies in defeating their opponent. Nevertheless, no matter their true plan, it is still 
important to study the influence that these men had in relation to their roles with the U.S. 
government.  
 
 The Golos-Bentley network was one of the most well developed spy rings within 
the U.S. government. If it had not been for Golos’ death and Bentley’s defection, the 
network would have probably continued to run smoothly. Nevertheless, their espionage 
was still second in importance to the work of those spies working within the atomic 
intelligence field. One of the most significant projects that was taken on by Americans 
during World War II was the development of an atomic bomb that could cripple whole 
cities within an instance. Starting in 1939, scientists from England had been working on 
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the possibility of “utilizing the atomic energy of uranium for military purposes.”127  The 
report was brought to the United States government in September of 1941, with the 
proposal of a joint, but informal partnership in order to create the atomic bomb.128 By the 
early 1940s the American effort to procure the bomb first had increased dramatically. 
Scientists from Britain came to the United States and collaborated at either the Los 
Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico or the Oak Ridge Facility in Tennessee. This urgency 
came from the American and British fear that German scientists would develop a similar 
bomb before they finished their own. Despite their fear, the Germans were actually fairly 
slow in the development of this technology and were incapable of producing an atomic 
bomb during wartime Germany.129  
 While the United States and the British were pushing for the bomb on their own, 
the Soviet Union was being slowly informed of their allies’ efforts. Anatolii Gorskii 
informed the Soviets of the Maud Committee’s initial report on September 25, 1941.130 
As a result of the information that Gorskii reported to the USSR, “the Soviet government 
now knew that Britain had decided to build an atomic bomb, that British scientists 
estimated that it would take between two and five years to do this, and that Britain had 
decided to build a gaseous diffusion separation plant in North America.”131 Despite these 
findings, the Soviet Union did not begin to develop their bomb right away. By 1942, 
Lavrentiy Beria (Commissar General of State Security in the Soviet Union) had tried to 
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push Stalin to put more effort into their atomic project.132 Stalin agreed and in 1943 the 
Soviet atomic project was underway. Igor Kurchatov was appointed the head of the 
Soviet atomic program on March 10, 1943. David Holloway expertly explains the 
controversial beginnings of the Soviet bomb in his book Stalin and the Bomb. He 
describes how Stalin received a lot of information before 1943 about how there was no 
use in working on a nuclear project because the war would most likely be over before 
they could finish. However, despite these warnings, Stalin decided to go through with the 
project. As Holloway explains, “the project he started is best understood as a rather small 
hedge against future uncertainties.”133 
 Although the Soviets decided to start their own nuclear program, they had to look 
elsewhere for inspiration on how to begin. Kurchatov contacted Gaik Ovakimian, deputy 
chief of the foreign department of the NKVD, with his goals for the project. Ovakimian 
then passed along this request to some of his agents abroad.134  While there is no doubt 
that the Soviets would have completed the building of an atomic bomb on their own time, 
the information that intelligence officers abroad provided sped up the process by a couple 
of years. Two of the most important agents to work with the USSR were Harry Gold and 
scientist Klaus Fuchs.  
 Harry Gold was born in Switzerland in 1912, but was a brought to the United 
States before he was even two years old. Gold was an accomplished spy by the time that 
he started working on the atomic project. Gold had been a spy since 1935 when he started 
working at the Pennsylvania Sugar Company. Thomas Lessing Black recruited him into 
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this industrial espionage by appealing to the needs of the struggling Soviet people.135 
However, Gold had no hesitations with joining and immediately agreed by saying that 
“the chance to help strengthen the Soviet Union appeared as such a wonderful 
opportunity.”136 In addition to his desire to help the Soviet people, he also was inclined to 
help the USSR because it was the first state to making anti-semitism illegal.137 (While 
this is true, it is also quite ridiculous in retrospect, considering Stalin sent many Jews to 
die in the Gulag throughout his tenure in office.)   
 Gold collected and copied blueprints from the Sugar Company throughout his 
first couple of years engaging in espionage. However, this type of system could not hold 
up. The amount of information that Gold was bringing in was too much for him and 
Black to copy and get back to the Soviets. Thankfully, the two were able to use the 
resources provided by AMTORG (the Soviet spy ring that doubled as an American 
trading company) and their intake increased.138 The amount of data that Gold was 
bringing in thoroughly impressed his Soviet handlers. Over time Gold would continue to 
rise in stature when working with Russian intelligence. Gold worked in industrial 
espionage for 9 years, but became so disillusioned with the whole process that he almost 
decided to cut ties with the work. He explains the tiresome aspects of his life in this 
excerpt:  
[T]he planning for a meeting with a Soviet agent; the careful preparations 
for obtaining data from Penn Sugar, the writing of technical reports and 
the filching of blueprints for spying (and then returning them); the 
meeting[s]… in New York or Cincinnati or Rochester or Buffalo… the 
difficulties I had raising money for all these trips; the cajoling of 
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Brothman…and the outright blackmailing of Ben Smilg [the Dayton 
aircraft engineer who refused to deal with Gold]… [and] the many lies I 
had to tell at home.139 
 
Furthermore, Gold only accepted $100 per month for all of what he did for the Soviets. 
This amount was intended to cover all his travel and food expenses, but was obviously 
not nearly enough. Nevertheless, Gold stuck with it because of his intense devotion to the 
cause. By 1942 Gold reported to Semyon Semonov and became thoroughly engaged once 
again because of the respect that he had for his new handler.   
 A year after Gold met Semonov he would be granted an even more important role 
in his work with Soviet intelligence. Semonov approached him with the idea in early 
January of 1944 and spoke to him in very cautious language. An excerpt from Harry 
Gold’s biography, The Invisible Harry Gold by Allen M. Hornblum, describes the 
interaction between Semonov and Gold: “Sam [Semonov] then asked an unusual 
question: Did Harry “wish to accept the assignment?” In the past, Harry “had always 
been told what to do” and when to do it. And there was another thing: Sam said the 
assignment would be “extremely dangerous.”140 Semonov then introduced Gold to the 
idea of becoming the courier for Klaus Fuchs, a scientist working on creating one of the 
world’s most dangerous weapons. Gold accepted without hesitation.141  
 Klaus Fuchs was possibly the most important spy for the Soviet Union. Fuchs 
grew up in Germany throughout the early part of the twentieth century. Fuchs, like his 
father, was an outspoken communist and opponent of Nazism. He believed that “fascism 
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was the real enemy, and communism a moral parable of hope in an age of anxiety.”142As 
political hostility began to grow in Germany, Fuchs got increasingly concerned about his 
safety. By 1933 he had left Germany because of these concerns. Eventually he made it to 
the University of Bristol where he worked towards getting his PhD in physics in 1936. 
Fuchs applied for naturalization in 1939, but when war broke out between England and 
Germany, he was a labeled as an “enemy alien.”143 He spent six months in jail until the 
confusion was finally resolved. In 1941 he finally received his full British citizenship.144 
 1941 was a big year for Fuchs, as he joined the British atomic project during that 
year as well. Fuchs was typically very quiet about his political affiliation when he spoke 
with his scientific colleagues, but that did not stop him from continuing his work for the 
communist cause. He approached Jürgen Kuczynski (an old friend and GRU agent) to get 
him involved in some type of espionage. Kuczynski gave Fuchs his sister’s contact 
information and he met Ruth in 1942. Fuchs told her that he “would give her ‘classified 
and confidential… written data concerning atomic energy research.”145 Despite his clear 
willingness to commit espionage for the Soviets, he still took the British oath that 
committed him to the Official Secrets Act, which pledged him to keeping the secrets of 
the British government and its national security. He labeled this ability to balance both 
the British and the Soviets as a “controlled schizophrenia.”146 Nevertheless, the fact that 
he took the oath of silence with the British allowed him to be transferred to the Los 
Alamos facility in America very easily.  
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 It was when Fuchs was transferred to the American project that Harry Gold came 
into contact with him. Fuchs was now to be reporting to the KGB instead of the GRU. 
Fuchs’ new handler, Pavel Fitin, sent a letter that described Fuchs situation with the GRU 
and how to make contact with him once he reached America. Gold met with Fuchs for 
the first time in a China Town restaurant where they shared basic information. After the 
dinner, the two went on a lengthy walk in which they laid out how their future meetings 
would go and Fuchs gave Gold a basic understanding of the Manhattan Project.147 Gold 
was extremely impressed with Fuchs and his professionalism (especially compared to his 
old source, Abraham Brothman) and the two would have a very successful relationship 
together.  
 When Fuchs first came to America with the fourteen other British scientists, he 
was sent to work on gaseous diffusion as an employee at the Kellex Corporation. During 
this time Fuchs gave Gold thirteen significant scientific papers that outlined “the 
explosive properties of fissionable material and details about the plans for the Oak Ridge 
facility.”148 The Fuchs-Gold-Semonov network performed efficiently until 1944 when 
Semonov had to be sent back to the USSR. Growing surveillance put him at risk of 
revealing the whole program, so Anatoli Antonovich Yakovlev (Yatskov) replaced him 
that year. Gold was less than impressed with Semonov’s replacement, but he would 
nonetheless be his contact for the next two years.149 
 Fuchs knew about almost every part of the atomic plants in America. Manson 
Benedict of Kellex believed that if Fuchs were to speak to the Soviets, that they could 
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complete their building of an atomic bomb years before they otherwise would have.150 
Fuchs reported on a myriad of topics that inevitably did speed up the process. For 
example, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr list him as turning over… 
[I]nformation about the organization of the US atomic project and work on 
uranium separation, both gaseous diffusion and an alternative method, 
electromagnetic separation, developed at the University of California 
Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Other KGB messages report that Fuchs 
delivered information on the progress of the project and more technical 
details about gaseous diffusion.151 
 
Fuchs had a profound impact on the Soviet’s progress in their atomic research. Alexander 
Feklisov believes he was by far the most important spy within the Manhattan Project and 
that the Soviet Union was able to create their three bombs as replicas of the American 
models because of the information he turned over.152 He worked at Los Alamos until the 
British and American atomic bomb projects parted ways once again in 1946. Fuchs spied 
until testimony by Elizabeth Bentley and Igor Gouzenko (Soviet spy within Canada who 
defected) implicated him in espionage. Venona decryptions that the U.S. turned over to 
the British Security Service, MI5, further compromised his position. In 1950 Fuchs 
confessed to acts of espionage and served nine years in prison as a result. He turned in his 
courier, Harry Gold, during the process. Gold served sixteen of his thirty-year sentence 
after he confessed to espionage.153 Despite that they ended up getting caught, Fuchs and 
Gold were two of the most important Soviet agents during the race for the atomic bomb.  
 While Fuchs and Gold provided some of the most notable secrets back to the 
Soviet Union during the war, the USSR had many other agents working for them at the 
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same time. Another significant network within the Manhattan project was that of 
Theodore Hall, Saville Sax, Lona and Morris Cohen. Hall was recruited to work at Los 
Alamos only a year after he graduated from Harvard in 1944. Hall confided in one of his 
close friends from Harvard, Saville Sax, on a break during his first year working on the 
Manhattan Project that he believed the Soviet Union deserved to know the secrets of the 
program.154 Hall wrote about his decision to give the USSR secrets of the bomb in a letter 
from 1995, just after he had been publically suspected of espionage. He writes: 
My decision about contacting the Soviets was a gradual one, and it was 
entirely my own. It was entirely voluntary, not influenced by any other 
individual or by any organization such as the Communist Party or the 
Young Communist League. I was never “recruited” by anyone…. My 
political views had been shaped by the economic depression of the 1930s. 
With the New Deal Roosevelt had tried to restore prosperity, but this was 
only partly successful and it was not until the war that the depression 
really ended. What would happen when the war was over? …But it 
seemed to me that an American monopoly [over atomic bomb 
intelligence] was dangerous and should be prevented.155 
 
Hall wrote this letter with hindsight and the knowledge of what was to come with the 
Cold War in the years that followed World War Two. At the time, he believed that an 
exchange of nuclear knowledge would level the playing field once the Allies had won the 
war. Unfortunately, he was a bit off in his predictions. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union would access atomic weaponry by the end of the 1950s, which instead of 
balancing out the playing field made the competition between the two super powers 
grow. The ideological struggle between the two countries further complicated this 
relationship and the bomb gave them lobbying power against one another.  
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 Nevertheless, Hall joined the espionage network in 1944 working under Sergey 
Kurnakov. Kurnakov was a KGB agent who double as a writer for the CPUSA 
newspaper, the Daily Worker.156 Kurnakov proceeded with a bit of caution during his 
first meeting with Hall. While it was not unheard of, it was much more unlikely for a 
source to approach the KGB about providing them secrets. However, during their first 
meeting Hall brought Kurnakov a packet of documents that outlined “the progress of the 
research, and the roles of the chief scientists working on the bomb” that calmed many of 
Kurnakov’s fears.157   
 Hall had only been on his two-week furlough from Los Alamos when he had met 
Kurnakov. Since there was not a sufficient amount of time for Hall to make contact with 
an official KGB courier, the network decided to use his old friend, Sax, as his primary 
messenger. Hall was given the cover name Mlad or Youngster, while Sax was referred to 
Star or Oldster; each of their names can be found in about eight KGB cables that were 
decoded during the Venona Projects.158  When Hall worked at Los Alamos he was tasked 
with developing ways to use X-Rays to stimulate implosion in the atomic bomb.159 
Although he was not as important as the other Soviet source, Klaus Fuchs, he still passed 
along very valuable information to his handlers. For example, “Hall delivered reports on 
the implosion detonation system for the plutonium bomb and on the methods the 
Manhattan Project had developed to separate the needed uranium U-235 from the 
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unneeded U-238.”160 Hall continued to work at Los Alamos and deliver secrets to the 
USSR until the war ended.  
 Hall’s legacy is very convoluted. He maintained that he was never involved in 
espionage when he was first suspected in the 1950s. Hall and Sax’s names appeared in a 
deciphered KGB cable that brought their allegiance into doubt, but the two remained 
steadfast in their defense.161 When the Venona cables became public knowledge in 1995, 
Hall essentially admitted his guilt (in the letter quoted above). Hall moved to England in 
1962 and worked on cancer research for the remainder of his life until he passed away in 
1999.162   
 During Theodore Hall’s tenure working for Soviet espionage, Saville Sax did not 
always operate as his courier. Lona Cohen sometimes stepped in and collected documents 
from Hall. Lona and her husband Morris both worked covertly for the Soviet intelligence 
networks. Morris joined the American communist movement in 1935 at the age of 
twenty-five. Shortly after joining he went to Spain with a group of young American 
communists and fought for the Communist headed International Brigades.163 Morris 
clearly had a strong ideological tie towards communism, which was exhibited when he 
returned from abroad and began to work with the KGB through Semyon Semonov.164  
Morris was primarily a courier for Semonov, although he did recommend that his 
wife Lona also be brought into the service. During their early years of service the two 
delivered details on aircraft machine guns before they knew of the atomic bomb.165 Lona 
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also functioned as Theodore Hall’s courier at certain times during 1945 in New 
Mexico.166 One of the documents that Lona delivered from Hall is said to be one of the 
“first crude outlines of the atomic bomb.”167 The Cohens were a valuable asset to Soviet 
intelligence, but were forced to flee the United States in 1950 after Elizabeth Bentley’s 
defection. The two functioned as spies within England, posing as bookstore owners but 
actually providing the Soviet Union with secrets on the British Navy.168 The spy ring was 
cracked open in 1961 and the Cohens went to prison. However, what followed their arrest 
shows just how important they were to the Soviet Union. The USSR fought for their 
release and even traded the imprisonment of a British businessman for them to be 
freed.169  
 While the Cohen’s were a vital cog in the Soviet Union’s espionage machine, one 
of the most important networks that functioned during World War II was that of the 
Rosenberg’s.  The Rosenberg network was not only one of the largest Soviet rings, but it 
has also become one of the most notorious. The Rosenberg’s were convicted of spying on 
the United States and their trial became a national phenomenon that ended with their 
executions. Their network consisted of a myriad of agents within the U.S. government: 
Joel Barr, William Perl, Alfred Sarant, Morton Sobell, David Greenglass, and a sixth 
unknown; Michael and Ann Sidorovich worked as their couriers; Vivian Glassman, Ruth 
Greenglass, and Ethel Rosenberg provided assistance, if needed.170 
 The network originated with Julius Rosenberg during the 1930s. Julius attended 
the City College of New York in the late 1930s, where he joined the Young Communist 
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League. It was through these organizations that Julius was able to meet many of the 
people who would later function within his spy ring. After his graduation from CCNY in 
1940 he started to work at the “War Department’s Signal Supply Office,” where he met 
and became close with Alfred Sarant and Joel Barr.171 Rosenberg’s other friends from the 
YCL were in similar positions across the nation. Rosenberg “quickly realized that their 
positions offered them access to America’s advanced radio, radar, sonar, and other 
military electronics technology and decided to seek out Soviet intelligence to deliver 
these secrets to the USSR.”172  
 Finding a Soviet agent was a harder task than Rosenberg believed it would be. 
However, he was looking during the early 1940s, which was right after Stalin’s purge of 
his intelligence officers. Stalin’s paranoia had severely dismantled his networks abroad, 
but thankfully for Rosenberg, Jacob Golos had refused to return to the Soviet Union and 
remained an active agent. Rosenberg used his contacts within the Communist party, 
specifically Bernard Schuster, to finally reach out to Golos in 1942, where he was picked 
up as a source and given the codename Antennae, which would later change to Liberal.173  
 During the early years of the 1940s, the Rosenberg network’s handlers changed a 
few times as a consequence of Stalin’s purges. For example, in 1942 Vasiliy Zarubin 
came over from the Soviet Union and tried to re-organize the espionage networks 
functioning during the war. His re-organization eventually led to Jacob Golos (and then 
Elizabeth Bentley after his death) having to hand over their leadership of the Rosenberg 
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Network. The two resisted, but by 1944 Semyon Semonov had control of the Rosenberg 
spy ring.174 
 Julius Rosenberg’s espionage career was notable for the secrets that he passed 
over to the Soviets; however, the majority of Rosenberg’s value to the USSR actually 
came from his work in technical intelligence.175 Rosenberg collected documents on 
“advanced radio, radar, sonar, and other military electronics technology” that he thought 
could be useful for the Soviet cause.176 Semonov’s initial report on the Rosenberg 
network explains how the data that the workers were turning in while they worked under 
Golos was of low quality and was barely useful. However, he further explains that once 
Golos relinquished the group and he took over, the agents began to “mature[d] and 
obtain[ed] a number of highly valuable materials.”177 Semonov described Rosenberg as 
an enthusiastic recruit, who provided the Soviet Union with copious amounts of 
intelligence over the years.178 For example, after Rosenberg was let go from the Army 
Signal Corps in 1944 (for suspicions of being a communist), he provided details on the 
proximity fuse, a new and advanced product from the United States that allowed bombs 
or other types of warheads to explode when they got close enough to their target.179 
Rosenberg actually brought in a replicated version of the proximity fuse (a very risky 
choice), which shows how untrained he had been before Semonov took over his spy ring. 
  Nevertheless, Rosenberg was such a valuable asset to the Soviets not only for 
what he physically delivered to them, but because of whom he managed. One of 
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Rosenberg’s most useful assets was actually his wife, Ethel. The two met when they were 
in high school and eventually got married in 1939 and had two boys.180 However, the two 
had met much earlier, in 1932, where they got to know each other and developed their 
communist sympathies. Ethel was a very helpful support system to Julius during his years 
working in Soviet espionage and was actually the older sister of one of Julius’ main 
sources, David Greenglass.181  
 David was seven years younger than his sister, which greatly influenced why his 
life took the path that it did. When David was twelve, Ethel met Julius and the two 
became very adamant that David join the communist cause. David became a passionate 
communist, which can be shown from the letter between him and his wife, Ruth in the 
1940s. Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton’s book The Rosenberg File includes many of the 
letters that were exchanged between the couple, one of which explains David’s motive 
for handing over information to the Soviets: 
Darling, I love you and no matter what happens in America politically. In 
the end it will be Europe and a large part of Asia that will turn Socialist 
and the American end of the world will of necessity follow in the same 
course. So, dear, we still look forward to a Socialist America and we shall 
have that world in our time.182 
 
Greenglass’s beliefs proved very beneficial for the Rosenbergs, considering Greenglass 
would work for the Army at the Los Alamos nuclear plant starting in 1944.183 When 
Julius realized that David was working on this secret project he enlisted the help of 
David’s wife, Ruth, to convince him to hand over secrets on the bomb. At first, David 
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was reluctant to turn over any information, but the Rosenbergs tried to appeal to him by 
saying that the Russians were their allies and deserved to know this information.184 This 
obviously struck a cord with David and he began to furnish them with secrets soon after. 
David not only provided Julius with valuable facts about the American atomic bomb, but 
he told him about the scientists working on the project, and the dynamics of their work 
place.185 At one point, Greenglass even met with Harry Gold and provided him with 
“sketches of experiments… descriptive material regarding them…  possible recruits for 
espionage.”186 Greenglass received a monetary reward for the information he reported to 
Gold, but it was yet to be the most crucial piece of intelligence that he passed over. 
Greenglass confessed to turning over a detailed drawing and explanation of the same 
atomic bomb that was to be dropped on Hiroshima later that year.187  
 Greenglass continued to provide information to the Rosenbergs until 1949. 
However, by this time the relationship between the two couples had been somewhat 
strained.188 Greenglass did not heed his brother-in-laws warnings about the FBI, which 
would prove a big mistake. In June of 1950 Greenglass was arrested under suspicion of 
espionage.189 David’s wife, Ruth, was also arrested for her involvement (albeit limited) in 
spying activities. Harry Gold testified against both the Rosenbergs and Greenglasses and 
described the times that he had met with them. David not only added to Gold’s testimony 
against the Rosenbergs, but also gave false testimony against his sister, Ethel, instead of 
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the implicating his wife in the crime.190 However, the entire Rosenberg network did not 
go down when this testimony came out. There were still four other major players within 
the Rosenberg ring.  
 Alfred Sarant met Julius Rosenberg in 1940 when they were both working at the 
Army Signal Corps. While Rosenberg was let go because of his affiliation with 
communism, Sarant was fired because of his disruptive union work.191 Sarant then got a 
job at Western Electric working with radar. During this time he was living with his good 
friend and fellow technician and Soviet spy, Joel Barr. Unlike Sarant, Barr had been a 
classmate of Julius’ at the City College of New York. Barr met Sarant while working at 
Western Electric and the two became inseparable as a result. The KGB even 
acknowledged them as a packaged deal and their Soviet handler, Feklisov, claimed them 
to be two of the most worthwhile spies within the Rosenberg apparatus.192 Sarant and 
Barr carried out their espionage in a unique way: photographs. They had a dark room in 
their apartment that they used to develop film and hand off to either the Rosenbergs or 
Harry Gold.193 Sarant was able to give the Soviets “‘17 authentic drawings’ of Bell’s 
APQ-7, an airborne radar, in 1944” by taking photographs of them.194 
 After the war ended both Barr and Sarant left their jobs at Western Electric and 
tried to open an engineering firm together. Unfortunately, the firm failed and the two 
friends went their separate ways. When Harry Gold and David Greenglass confessed Barr 
was living in Paris and he disappeared soon after he learned of their testimony. Sarant 
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was less lucky. At the time of their confessions he was still living in the United States and 
was contacted by the government that he was under investigation and should halt all 
travel plans. Sarant, obviously understanding the outcome if he stayed in America, fled 
the United States for Mexico and was never seen again. Both Barr and Sarant left without 
even telling their families.195 While the Rosenbergs remained steadfast in their innocence, 
the fact that their associates fled at the mention of a trial did not help their cause.   
 Although Barr and Sarant were able to escape unscathed from betraying the 
United States, another associate of theirs was not so lucky. Morton Sobell was a Russian-
born immigrant to the United States and was a college friend of Julius Rosenberg. He 
shared Rosenberg’s feelings towards communism and began to report to him after he left 
college. Sobell worked as an electrical engineer at “an instrument company in New York 
City, where he had access to secret data.”196 The company was Reeves Electronic and he 
reported on “U.S. government contracts for secret military research.”197 Harvey Klehr 
and John Earl Haynes explain how the fact that Sobell was able to work with such 
sensitive material shows just how negligent the U.S. government was with 
counterespionage as this point in history: 
It is another illustration of the laxness of American internal security 
practices in the 1940s that Sobell, whom Naval Intelligence had marked as 
a supporter of the American Peace Mobilization, who had worked as a 
counselor at a Communist youth camp, and whose admiration for Stalin 
was hardly camouflaged, received a security clearance to work on 
American defense contracts as late as 1949.198 
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Therefore, despite all these red flags, the electronic company still chose to hire Sobell. 
However, when Sobell got word of Gold’s testimony he picked up and left for Mexico 
City with his entire family in tow. Unluckily for him, Mexican officials brought him into 
custody in August of 1950. Sobell was put on trial for his espionage activities and was 
sentenced to thirty years behind bars (he only served nineteen). In 2001 Sobell released 
an autobiography that claimed his innocence, but seven years later revised his statement 
and admitted his, as well as the Rosenbergs, guilt.199 
 Ironically, one of Soviet intelligence’s highest generals did not believe that the 
Rosenberg network was as significant as the American government made it out to be. 
Pavel Sudoplatov claims that he was relatively unalarmed when he heard of their arrests 
because they had no significant role in atomic intelligence.200 Sudoplatov’s opinion is 
important to be considered, but it is also valuable to understand when and why he was 
writing these thoughts. Sudoplatov’s autobiography Special Tasks was released in the 
1990s, many years after he was involved in Soviet affairs. He was the head of 
“Department S” during the 1940s, which was responsible for operating atomic 
intelligence efforts abroad.201  
 Despite Sudoplatov’s “inside look” into the secret world of Soviet intelligence 
networks, many of his claims have been disputed. Sudoplatov claimed that American 
atomic scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard all 
committed acts of espionage, which have been proven to be false.202 Furthermore, 
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Sudoplatov recounted his experiences nearly fifty years after they occurred and provided 
little to no physical evidence for his claims. Nevertheless, it is important to understand 
the perspective of actors such as Sudoplatov because they give us insight into larger 
aspects of the conflict. For example, Sudoplatov’s exaggerated retelling of the past tells 
us the type of legacy that he hoped to leave behind of the now defunct Soviet Union. 
Sudoplatov’s goal was to show the power of the country that he dedicated his life to, but 
that eventually crumbled to pieces. This is important when considering the way that the 
American and Soviet tensions heightened when the fighting stopped in Europe and in 
Asia.  
 Nonetheless, what the Soviet spies provided to the USSR was of great 
significance during World War II. While the Soviet Union would have eventually created 
an atomic bomb on their own, their access to American intelligence allowed them to have 
this dangerous weapon only a few years after the war ended. This fact is extremely 
important. Those few years were extremely crucial as they gave both the United States 
and the Soviet Union an object of leverage against each other, thus increasing the friction 
between the two countries at the outset of the Cold War.    
 54 
Chapter 3: Cold War Spies 
 
 
The end of World War II allowed America to return to the normalcy of life before 
the bloody conflict. However, while the German and Japanese threats were gone, the 
United States had a new enemy. The Soviet Union and the United States had been allies 
throughout the war, yet when the conflict ended their relationship turned very tense. Part 
of this tension stemmed from the leaders of those countries. While Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt had a very amicable relationship with his counterpart, Joseph Stalin, his life 
did not last long enough to see the end of the war. FDR passed away in April of 1945, 
leaving his smart, but inexperienced Vice-President Harry Truman in charge. Only days 
after Roosevelt passed away, Truman was told of the existence of the Manhattan Project. 
This unfortunately put Truman in a very difficult spot. Not only would he have to control 
the domestic transition into a stable post-war world, but he would also need to decide 
whether or not to use this horrible weapon to end the war in the Pacific.   
Post-World War II tensions only intensified as the Allies attempted to divide up 
the now defunct governments and their territories in Europe. This led to obvious conflicts 
between Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union, as the former two were very much against 
the spread of communism into new territories. Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt gathered 
for the Yalta Conference in February 1945, in which they discussed the breakdown of the 
European territories. Stalin had specific interests in the territories of Eastern Europe, but 
the Big Three agreed to allow for free elections in all of these new states. Unfortunately, 
Stalin did not follow through with his promises and within months of the agreement, 
Socialist Republic’s were set up in all the states bordering the USSR. Almost a year later, 
Winston Churchill expressed his discontent with the Soviet Union’s actions in his famous 
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“Iron Curtain” speech. The speech outlined the American and the British government’s 
intolerance towards the Soviet Union’s unlawful spread of power across Europe.203 This 
increased tension between the Soviet Union and the West lasted up until the collapse of 
the Soviet government in 1991.  
The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was further 
strained during the post-war period because of the defections of Soviet spies to the 
American and Canadian governments. The defections of Elizabeth Bentley and Igor 
Gouzenko brought attention of the Soviet threat to North America in the second half of 
the 1940s. These defections increased the friction between the two countries and as a 
result of these defections, the American government had to rethink its counterespionage 
network, while the Soviet Union had to reconfigure its now defunct intelligence system. 
Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
were established only a few years after the end of World War II to increase America’s 
ability to prevent breaches in intelligence. While the United States was creating new 
counterintelligence structures, Soviet intelligence was trying to rebuild their spy 
networks. 
 
Spying has been a constant of international relations, but during the Cold War 
there was a significant shift in the reasons that people decided to spy. Right before and 
during World War II many of the Soviet spies passed secrets because their ideologies 
aligned better with the communist regime. The United States had just suffered a massive 
depression during the 1930s and was then propelled into another World War; thus 
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causing many people to question if democracy was the correct form of government. 
However, after World War II many Americans were confident in their leadership. This 
led many of those who spied during the Cold War to spy for monetary reasons rather than 
for ideology. Especially, considering the fact that by the 1960s many people believe that 
the Soviet Union was not going to withstand the test of time.204  Furthermore, a leaked 
1956 speech to the Communist Party by Soviet leader, Nikita Krushchev, outlined all the 
ways in which he believed Stalin had failed. The speech was named the “Secret Speech” 
because all press was excluded from attending the event so that Krushchev could speak 
freely. Nevertheless, the speech leaked very quickly and the world became aware of 
Stalin’s anti-Semitism and his purges, which further dismantled the already disintegrating 
Communist Party of America.205 The motive for many of the Cold War spies shifted 
away from ideology and many spies now either participated because of their own 
personal crises or because of the monetary reward that they could receive. The espionage 
targeted almost every single U.S. defense agency, except for the Coast Guard.206 These 
spies handed over information that “could have shifted the balance in a war with the 
Soviet Union.”207 The espionage that occurred during the Cold War gave the Soviet 
Union some crucial information that allowed them to manage the U.S. threat.  
 
Two of the first Soviet spies after World War II did not actually participate in 
covert networks because of monetary reasons. These two were some of the last spies who 
                                                
204 John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped 
American Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 230. 
205 Haynes, Klehr, 230.  
206 Michael J. Sulick, Spying in America: Espionage From the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of 
the Cold War, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 267. 
207 Sulick, 272. 
 57 
opted for espionage because of their ideological views. Bernon F. Mitchell was from San 
Francisco and studied statistics at the California Institute of Technology until he joined 
the Navy.208 Mitchell met the Georgia native, William H. Martin, while he was in the 
Navy in 1950. The two continued to work together when they got jobs at the National 
Security Agency as mathematicians in 1957.209 The two men decided to defect to the 
Soviet Union in 1960 because of their anger towards the United States. The American 
Navy had been sending planes into Soviet airspace and causing them to get shot down, 
which greatly disturbed the pair.210 The two started to think that maybe their beliefs 
aligned better with those of the Soviet Union, as they had both been unreligious as 
well.211 It was then that the two decided to defect.  
Martin went to Urbana University in Ohio where he sought out communists to 
help him locate someone to provide information to.212 Shortly after this, the two escaped 
during their vacation from work to the Soviet Union. They not only left behind a note that 
described their motive, but they held a press conference in Moscow, in which they fielded 
questions.213 The two explained more of their grievances with the United States, like the 
fact that they did not respect the privacy of their allies and that women were actually 
treated better in the Soviet Union because they were given more opportunities for 
education, and thus would make better mates.214 Unfortunately for Mitchell and Martin, 
they got their opinions of the Soviet Union from propaganda magazines like Soviet Life 
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and USSR.215 Soon after they settled into their new lives in Russia, they realized that the 
magazines had fooled them.216 Martin even tried to return to the United States, but was 
obviously denied entry into the country.217 Martin died in Mexico at the young age of 56, 
while Mitchell remained in the Soviet Union until he passed away at 72 in 2001.218 
 Despite the fact that the two men regretted their crime, they were still never to be 
welcome back into the United States. The two men had provided a “gold mine of 
cryptographic information” to the Soviet Union, as well as slandered the United States.219 
The United States did what it could to recover from their defection and defamation by 
labeling them as ‘sexual deviants’, but unfortunately the damage had been done. They 
were the worst security breach since Fuchs, and President Truman even said that he 
thought they should be shot.220   
Although Mitchell and Martin provided important information to the Soviet 
Union, there were also other spies that provided a lot of crucial information from within 
the American National Security Agency. Jack Dunlap was a decorated Army Sergeant 
before he joined the NSA in 1958. Working for the government does not pay well and 
Dunlap was struggling to support his family on $100 per month salary.221 Dunlap reached 
out to Soviet handlers and began to hand over information in 1960. Dunlap was very 
flashy with his new source of wealth. He bought both Jaguars and Cadillacs and spent his 
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time as a “womanizing, beer-drinking ‘family man’ with a wife and five children.”222 He 
also spent time with his mistresses and at the yacht club, and while everyone else seemed 
to notice his new affluence, his employer remained unaware.223 Overall, Dunlap was a 
very effective spy. James Bamford in The Puzzle Palace describes all the information that 
he gave over to the Soviets from the NSA during a three-year period and the 
consequences that this had:  
The damage to America’s SIGINT and COMSEC operations during those 
years cannot even be estimated, for no one except his KGB handlers will 
ever know exactly which documents were sold. One Pentagon official 
later commented that Dunlap’s treason was “thirty to forty times as serious 
as the Mitchell and Martin defections.”224 
 
While Dunlap provided a myriad of information over to the Soviet Union, his work with 
espionage led him to his eventual demise. The NSA began to take precautions against 
spies within their agency and administered polygraph tests to all their employees. 
Dunlap’s examiner noted some concerns with his initial test and told him that he should 
come in to retake the test on the following Monday. Dunlap was extremely paranoid and 
had already tried to take his life before he was under suspicion, so this new development 
only intensified his efforts. Dunlap was successful and on July 23, 1963 he died from 
carbon monoxide poisoning.225 It was after his death that the FBI learned of his spying 
efforts. 
 The year that the FBI learned of Dunlap’s treachery was the same year that they 
unearthed another spy. John Butenko worked for the International Electronic Company, 
which was collaborating with the United States Air Force to “produce a command and 
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control system for the Strategic Air Command.”226 At this post he was given access to 
many top-secret documents that he transferred over to the KGB between April and 
October 1963. Butenko had been meeting with Soviet national and AMTORG employee, 
Igor Ivanov, as well as employees from the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, Gleb A. 
Pavlov, Yuri A. Romashin and Vladimir I. Olenev.227 The FBI observed these meetings 
and eventually convicted Butenko and Ivanov of spying against the United States.228 
Butenko was sentenced to a thirty-year sentence for his transgressions against the United 
States.229  
 Although the FBI was catching various spies at the beginning of the Cold War, 
that did not stop many more agents from continuing their efforts. For example, 
Christopher J. Boyce and his childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, spied for the Soviet 
Union during 1975 and 1976. Boyce’s father had worked in the FBI when he was a child 
and helped him procure a job working for TRW Inc. His position put him in close contact 
with the communications between the company and the CIA, which he realized he could 
utilize for his own benefit.230 Lee acted as a courier for Boyce and the two delivered 
information on satellite systems and submarine routes to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico 
City.231 The two received $77,000 for their spying, which they claimed they did because 
Boyce had become disillusioned with the United States government. When asked about 
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why he decided to spy, Boyce explained that a lot of it had to do with his childhood. He 
described how growing up through Kennedy’s assassination, the race riots, the Vietnam 
War (and seeing the U.S. use napalm) and then the Richard Nixon scandal, made him 
become very angry at the American government.232 He even said that he thought that he 
could “use the KGB to bash the CIA.”233 However, he does acknowledge that his motive 
was different from spies of the past. While World War II spies did so because they agreed 
with Soviet ideology, he explains, “Nobody these days is spying to help the Soviet Union 
or to further their ideology because their ideology is pretty much bankrupt.”234 He spied 
because he was frustrated with the American government, especially with how the United 
States conducted foreign affairs (specifically with Australia).235 Nevertheless, he also 
acknowledges that with hindsight, he understands that he committed treason and was 
wrongful in doing so.236 
 However, Boyce and Lee’s espionage did not last very long. Lee had a drug 
problem that not only made him act irrationally, but made him an annoyance to his Soviet 
handlers. In an attempt to contact his handlers, Lee tried to deliver a message to the 
Soviets at their Embassy in Mexico City by throwing a note over their fence, which got 
him arrested by the local police.237 He was mistakenly accused of murdering a Mexican 
police officer, but during the interrogation he confessed to his actual crime of espionage 
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against the United States.238 In his confession he implicated his friend Boyce and the two 
were arrested by the United States government soon after.239 Lee was sentenced to life in 
prison, while Boyce only received forty years.240 However, Boyce eventually procured 
twenty-eight more years to his sentence after he escaped from his prison and spent two 
years robbing banks in the north western United States.241  
 Many Cold War spies were not only motivated by their problems with U.S. 
policy, but also because of their own selfish greed. John Anthony Walker, Jr.’s claimed 
that his motive for handing over secrets to the Soviet Union went beyond just his need for 
money. In his memoir My Life as a Spy he explained how “he operated from a ‘Don 
Quixote-like’ attitude and wanted to end the Cold War by sharing America’s plans with 
the Soviet Union. In doing so, he said, the Soviets would see that the United States had 
no intention of going to war.”242 This interpretation may have been a self-serving 
realization, as selling out your own country for money is a lot less appealing than selling 
out your country in an attempt to prevent World War III. Despite what his reasoning may 
have been for providing “top cryptographic secrets” to his Soviet handlers, he was 
guilty.243  
 Walker is a very interesting case of Soviet espionage because while he was retired 
he was able to continue his spying. In the beginning of his career he worked as a U.S. 
                                                
238 Squatriglia, “US Spy Freed After 25 Years in Prison: Christopher Boyce Sold Secrets to 
Soviets.” 
239 Squatriglia, “US Spy Freed After 25 Years in Prison: Christopher Boyce Sold Secrets to 
Soviets.” 
240 Sibley, 228. 
241 Sibley, 228. 
242 Denise M. Watson, “Spy Ring Mastermind John Walker Dies in N.C. Prison,” The Virginia-
Pilot, Last modified August 30, 2014, http://hamptonroads.com/2014/08/spy-ring-mastermind-
john-walker-dies-nc-prison.  
243 “The Year of the Spy,” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/the-year-of-the-spy. 
 63 
Navy Warrant Officer and communications specialist from 1967 to 1985.244 During that 
time he sold over one million documents worth of Naval dispatches to the Soviet Union. 
Walker enlisted his son, his brother and his good friend into his network so that he could 
continue to spy after he retired. The FBI has said that what Walker and his group 
provided to the USSR “could have been devastating to the U.S. had the nation gone to 
war with the Soviets.”245 This realization called his motive into question. While he 
claimed that he spied for the Soviets so that he could prevent war, it is clear that the 
information he provided could have been used by the Soviet Union to be successful in 
battle against the U.S. Therefore, his true motive could be clouded by his hopes to not 
sound like a greedy man.   
 Nevertheless, there were still many spies that provided information to the Soviets 
because of the monetary reward. Many people working for government agencies such as 
the NSA held low paying jobs that made living in places like Washington, D.C. and New 
York City difficult. Ronald William Pelton of the NSA is a good example. Pelton had 
worked as a communications specialist at the NSA, but began to sell secrets to the Soviet 
Embassy in D.C. after he retired.246 Pelton sold secrets from 1980 through 1985 until he 
was caught and sentenced to serve life in prison for his spying.247  
 Many people initially became spies because of the quick money that they could 
receive, yet claimed that it was not their greed that made them do it. For example, Earl 
Pitts claimed that he was “still a Patriot” even though he spied.248 He claimed that saying 
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that he spied for greed was too simple a reason. He explained that he did it because of a 
“rigorous childhood that gave him a streak of perfectionism and an enduring fear of 
failure” that he endured from his strict upbringing in Missouri.249 Pitts began to work for 
the FBI in New York City, but like many other government employees, was unable to 
afford the high cost of living on such a small paycheck.250 At one point he had to ask his 
father to borrow money, which he said was one of the most humiliating moments of his 
life.251 It was because of these money issues and his fear of humiliation that he began to 
spy for the KGB.252 He enjoyed his work for some time, but eventually became 
frustrated. While he handed over “lists of Russian diplomats whom the FBI suspected of 
spying for the Soviets…” he also “faked other documents,” like papers that he copied 
directly from Newsweek.253 Pitts worked as a spy from 1987 until 1992 when he became 
dormant. Over that time he earned himself an extra $224,000 from the Soviet Union.254 
However, in 1995 the FBI suspected him of previous espionage and set him up in a sting 
operation. It was through this sting that Pitts was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his 
crimes.255  
 Aldrich Ames is another example of a Soviet spy who was purely motivated by 
money. Ames started working at the CIA in the 1960s as a case officer that specialized in 
Russian affairs.256 His time working at the CIA was characterized by alcoholism, adultery 
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and unproductivity.257 Not only that, but Ames had a track record of being a careless 
agent and on one occasion he even left a briefcase full of classified documents on a 
train.258 Fortunately, the briefcase was recovered; however, Ames continued to have 
trouble abiding by the rules of the CIA. In the early 1980s he started a relationship with 
one of his foreign assets, which was against the CIA’s code of conduct.259 This eventually 
led to a messy divorce with his first wife, in which he lost a lot of money. As has been 
examined with the spies who were already mentioned, surviving on a government 
paycheck in an expensive city is not the easiest task to complete. It was because of this 
situation that Ames concocted a plot to trick the Soviets. 
 Ames had been head of the counterintelligence branch of the CIA’s Soviet 
division starting in September of 1983.260 This position gave Ames access to vital 
information that would prove very useful to the Soviet Union, specifically details on who 
and where the United States spies were that were operating abroad.261 Ames’ access to 
this information paired with his extreme debt created his formula for espionage. He 
believed that he could sell the KGB “useless information” that he could pass as valuable 
and receive a big pay out for it.262 Ames was seemingly correct, as he received $50,000 
after he committed his first act of espionage.263  
 However, as Ames continued to work within the CIA, he realized that his delivery 
of this information could turn into something more. Not only had he already betrayed his 
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country (a crime for which he would have to pay), but he also left himself vulnerable to 
being found out. With American spies abroad in the Soviet Union, he was defenseless if 
they heard that he had provided information to the Soviets. These circumstances led 
Ames to decide to fully commit to espionage and turn in “over six pounds of hundreds of 
pages of documents.”264 Ames told the Soviets the names of the secret American agents 
that were working in their government, which in turn led to many of their deaths.265 
Ames has talked about this decision in the book Betrayal by Tim Weiner, David 
Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis by saying “in a sense, I was delivering myself along with 
them. I was saying: Over to you, KGB. You guys take care of me now. I’ve done this. 
I’ve demonstrated that I’m holding nothing back. You guys take care of me.”266 
 This decision provided Ames with more than enough money to repay his debts. 
Ames “handed over the names of virtually every CIA intelligence source in the Soviet 
Union, sending ten to their execution and many others to prison. For this he was 
eventually paid $2.7 million by the KGB and promised another $1.9 million, for a total of 
$4.6 million.”267 Ames handed over some of America’s most important agents, like 
Dmitri Polyakov, who had provided information to the FBI of the Soviet Union’s foreign 
affairs with China and their role in the Gulf War.268 The information that Ames delivered 
to the KGB essentially dismantled the entire covert network that the United States had 
working within the Soviet Union.269 This information set the American government back 
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many steps in its attempt to develop a large and informative intelligence network within 
the Soviet Union.  
 Despite Ames’ successful espionage, his noted carelessness still remained in 
many aspects of his life. He became extremely wealthy from his spying for the Soviet 
Union, but failed to hide it. Ames spent his money on lavish commodities like a Jaguar 
and a new house, which still went undetected by his supervisor.270 The way that Ames 
was spending his money was a clear sign of his espionage, as he would have never been 
able to afford these items on his usual government salary. Nevertheless, it took the FBI 
eight years until they came to the logical conclusion that the drunk and careless employee 
who lived a lavish lifestyle might be the spy.271 The FBI conducted a ten-month 
investigation before they convicted Aldrich Ames to a life sentence because of his 
crimes.272  
 While the Ames case was one of the worst breeches in American intelligence, it 
was still second to that of Robert Hanssen. Hanssen’s spying has become one of the most 
notorious scandals in Cold War espionage. Hanssen provided the Soviet Union with even 
more information than what Ames was able to provide to them. His story shocked the 
intelligence community and the rest of the United States.  
 Hanssen grew up in Illinois and spent years trying to figure out his true passion. 
He met his wife, Bonnie, while he studied dentistry, but he would not pursue a career in 
the medical field.273 Hanssen followed his father’s footsteps and joined the Chicago 
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Police Force until 1976 when he started to work at the FBI.274 During his time working 
for the police force, Hanssen attended “a secret counterintelligence school to learn how to 
install bugs and other high-tech surveillance equipment.” 275  His interest in 
counterintelligence prompted his decision to join the FBI and prove to his father that he 
would not be a failure.276 
Hanssen and his family moved to a small suburb outside of New York City when 
he started working as a special agent.277 The two were very religious followers of the 
Opus Dei sect of Christianity, so much so that many times Robert tried to push his 
religion on others.278 Hanssen and Bonnie had six children that he would try to support in 
their modest, yet still expensive home.279 During the FBI’s investigation into Hanssen in 
2002, he confessed that it was because of this situation that he began his espionage. He is 
quoted in David Wise’s book Spy as saying, “I wanted to get a little money and to get out 
of it.... the pressure of supporting a growing family in New York City on an inadequate 
Bureau salary.” 280  Furthermore, Hanssen’s religious affiliation also alludes to this 
conclusion. The Opus Dei sect of the Roman Catholic Church was a very conservative 
branch, which directly conflicts with the Soviet Union’s communist ideals of Atheism. 
Therefore, Hanssen’s spying was most likely purely for money, and not because of 
ideological similarities.  
 Hanssen began to spy for the Soviet Union in 1979 by contacting the AMTORG 
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Trading Company to get in touch with a GRU agent.281 Over the years Hanssen would 
deliver information through at least twenty dead-drops that his Soviet handler, 
Cherkashin (the same handler as Aldrich Ames), would receive.282 Robert Hanssen’s 
affidavit explained all the information he turned over and its value: 
Overall, Hanssen gave the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of valuable 
documentary material, according to the affidavit. The affidavit alleges that 
Hanssen compromised numerous human sources of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, dozens of classified U.S. Government documents, including 
“Top Secret” and “codeword” documents, and technical operations of 
extraordinary importance and value. It also alleges that Hanssen 
compromised FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources, 
methods and operations, and disclosed to the KGB the FBI’s secret 
investigation of Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, for espionage.283 
 
 In addition to all the information that Hanssen provided to the Soviet Union, he 
also hurt the United States in a different way as well. In 1985, after the executions of 
American agents, Valery Martynov and Sergei Motorin, who were working in the KGB, 
the FBI was baffled at what went wrong.284 The FBI set up an investigation into possible 
moles within the government to figure out who could have turned over American assets. 
At the head of the team was Robert Hanssen. Hanssen thus humiliated the Bureau 
through his performance as a Soviet informant. It was through his position and training 
with the FBI that Hanssen was capable of living these two separate lives.285  Eric O’Neill, 
who was assigned to act as his field operative but was actually investigating his actions, 
believes that Hanssen was able to compartmentalize his two different lives very 
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effectively.286 O’Neill conducted an interview with CSPAN after the release of the movie 
“Breach” in 2007, which was based on the investigation into Hanssen through the eyes of 
O’Neill. O’Neill explains how he believed that Hanssen did start to participate in 
espionage because of money problems, but how his ego eventually began to take over 
and he felt like ‘James Bond.’287 Another source, Joe Tierney (who was Hanssen’s 
superior at the FBI) said that he believed Hanssen had always considered giving 
information to the Soviet Union, but that the cost of living in New York “pushed him 
over the edge.”288  
 Whatever his motive, Hanssen conducted espionage for twenty-two important 
years between the United States and the Soviet Union. He began in a time of tense 
relations between the two countries, which made his betrayal all the more significant. 
Hanssen was eventually caught in the midst of a dead-drop in Foxstone Park, an act that 
he had carried out many times before.289 However, by this time Hanssen was not 
delivering information to the Soviet Union, he was delivering it to the Russian 
Federation. In 1991 Hanssen had decided to end his espionage, as it was obvious that the 
Soviet Union was about to collapse.290 Nevertheless, Hanssen could not stay away and he 
began to work with the newly formed Russian government in 1993.291 Therefore, when 
the FBI finally caught Hanssen he was working for the Russian Federation. Hanssen’s 
tenure as a spy lasted for twenty-two years until he was sentenced to life in prison.292 Part 
of Hanssen’s deal denied him the right to talk about his story to the press, but gave his 
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family his pension. 293 This punished Hanssen by prohibiting him from making any more 
money from his treachery, but did not hurt his family in the process. Nevertheless, 
Hanssen will remain one of the most detrimental and notorious spies of the Cold War. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
 
Soviet spying throughout the twentieth century was a constant within the United 
States. Starting in the 1930s, the Soviet Union began to place/recruit agents abroad, so 
that they could get an inside look at the development of other countries. This espionage 
quickly gained more importance with the onset of World War II. Not only were the 
Soviets looking for information on military tactics, but they were also trying to use their 
spies to learn secrets on how to develop a nuclear weapon. While the spying that was 
done throughout World War II was extremely dangerous to American national security, 
the spying that took place during the Cold War was just as significant, yet in a different 
way. The secrets that spies like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen turned over to the 
Soviet Union had a detrimental impact on the American counterintelligence system and 
put the lives of many American agents in danger. As the years passed their motives for 
spying also shifted.  The spies from the years before and during World War II had a very 
different rationale for committing espionage than the spies who turned over secrets 
throughout The Cold War. Despite all of these facts, the Soviet Union was not the only 
country that committed espionage during the twentieth century.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States also had its own agents 
working within the Soviet Union. For example, Oleg Penkovsky, a deputy in the Foreign 
Department of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research (the Soviet 
organization that gathered foreign intelligence), had spent most of his life in service to 
the Soviet Union, but decided to defect to the United States in 1960.294 He began to 
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disagree with the ideology of his home country and believed that by helping the United 
States he would become a “soldier for freedom.”295 Penkovsky was an important asset to 
the United States because he provided America with information on the Russian 
intentions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which helped John F. Kennedy avoid nuclear 
disaster with the USSR.296 However, like many other of the American agents working 
within the Soviet Union, he was executed after the KGB learned of his treachery.297 
Specifically, Jack Dunlap told the Soviet Union of Penkovsky’s spying, which ultimately 
got him killed.298  
Nevertheless, Penkovsky was not the only American spy working within the 
Soviet Union throughout this time period. During the twentieth century there were many 
spies who provided information to the United States, making the Soviet Union not the 
only guilty actor in international espionage. No matter the time or relationship between 
two countries, there will always be espionage occurring. It is a constant in international 
relations and with increasingly more technology, the stakes get higher. This is clearly 
represented through the progression of spying during the twentieth century. 
The Soviet espionage that occurred during the 1930s was mainly focused on 
collecting information on American industrial knowledge. In addition, organizations like 
the AMTORG Trading Company were set up to help more Soviet agents get into the 
United States without detection. During the pre-war period, Soviet espionage was laying 
the groundwork for future espionage within the United States. Although the leaders were 






not aware that a massive World War would break out within the next decade, their work 
helped them when it did occur.  
Many of the Soviet spies during the pre-war period turned information over to the 
Soviet Union because of ideological reasons. The USSR had just been established and 
had a very unique and new form of politics. Many Americans were interested in 
communism because they believed that it could be more successful than the U.S. form of 
democracy and capitalism, which was failing in the midst of the Great Depression. Spies 
like Nicolas Dozenberg and Whittaker Chambers used their affiliation with the 
Communist Party of the United States of America to spy for the Soviet Union. Since the 
Soviet Union knew that the Americans in the CPUSA had an ideological affiliation with 
communism, they were more likely to trust them when they were asked to spy for the 
Soviet cause.  
Many of the spies that provided secrets before World War II were very successful 
because of the laxity of the American government’s counterintelligence system. 
Katherine Sibley’s book Red Spies in America explains how the Soviet’s were able to 
take advantage of the United States’ underdeveloped counterintelligence system in the 
1930s because of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of international openness. She describes 
how “Moscow was free then to conduct a wide-scale effort to gather American industrial 
information from factory inspection tours and a network of strategically placed agents 
and contacts of the NKVD.”299 Therefore, it was not because of the negligent American 
counterintelligence network that many of the Soviet spies were caught, it was actually 
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because of agents like Whittaker Chambers, who turned themselves (and other spies) in 
years later when he defected back to the United States.  
While the information that spies turned over to their Soviet counterparts was 
significant during the years before the war, its importance increased substantially during 
World War II. Although the United States and the Soviet Union were allies when the U.S. 
joined the war effort in 1941, the Soviets still had their spies operating within America. 
However, the stakes were significantly raised during the war period. Not only was there 
greater technological information for the United States to hide, but the Soviet spies also 
infiltrated increasingly more important positions within the American government.  For 
example, spies were both some of the chief architects of the atomic project as well as the 
directors of the International Monetary Fund during World War II.  
These wartime spies worked for the Soviet Union for similar reasons as the spies 
who provided information before the war broke out. The incentive to give information 
over to the Soviet Union came from their ideological commitment to Communism. For 
example, spies like Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Victor Perlo, and Jacob Golos provided 
information to the USSR because of their affiliation with the CPUSA and their belief that 
communism would survive the test of time. Klaus Fuchs, a German refugee and one of 
the most important war time spies for the Soviet Union, turned over information to them 
because he believed that communism was the only way to end Nazism.300 Like many 
other atomic spies, he believed that the United States would not care if the Soviet Union 
did not survive the war.301 Many of the atomic spies provided information to Russia 
because they believed in the idea of sharing scientific knowledge, especially with 
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countries that were their allies. They did this in an attempt to not only get the bomb 
finished and functional before their enemies did, but so that one country (the United 
States) would not have all nuclear power when the project was completed.  
 It was also during World War II that the American government learned how to 
deal with espionage. When first confronted with the issue of espionage, the American 
leadership was much more concerned with maintaining an amicable relationship with the 
Soviet Union than prosecuting their spies. Spies like Abraham Glasser and Nicolas 
Dozenberg were never convicted for their spying, but were either punished by losing their 
jobs or were convicted of a lesser offense (like passport fraud for Dozenberg). During the 
years when the Soviet Union and the United States were allies, FDR was careful to not 
strain relations, but instead handled situations like this quietly.302 However, with the 
onset of war, the American government stepped up its defenses against spying. The 
powers of the FBI were expanded while the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency were both created. By the end of the 1950s, the American 
counterintelligence system had been completely refocused and many more employees 
were now working in counter espionage.303 Furthermore, spy trials became a constant in 
America at the end of the 1950s, which drastically changed the American mindset. The 
Rosenbergs were treated much differently than their earlier counterparts, Glasser and 
Dozenberg. The Rosenbergs were given the death penalty when they would not confess 
to their crimes, which heightened American apprehension about the Soviet threat. 
 However, despite the increased awareness of the American counterintelligence 
system, there were still Soviet spies operating within the United States throughout the rest 
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of the twentieth century. Many of these spies had very different reasons for handing over 
information to the Soviet Union than the spies of the past.  The ideological argument for 
espionage ended with the beginning of the Cold War. In Michael J. Sulick’s book Spying 
in America; he quotes the Department of Defense study on espionage by Americans 
between 1947-2001:  
Americans most consistently have cited money as the dominant motive for 
espionage and over time money has increased in predominance among 
motives… Of individuals who professed a single motive for espionage, 
one-forth of the civilians and three-fourths of the military claimed they 
had spied for money.304 
 
This was clearly the case for the majority of the spies who worked for the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War. However, there was still a minority that claims that they gave 
information to the USSR for ideological reasons. For example, both Bernon F. Mitchell 
and William H. Martin gave secrets over to the Soviet Union because they believed life 
was better in the Soviet Union. However, their opinions were based on what they read in 
the Soviet propaganda magazines, like Soviet Life and USSR.305 The two believed that the 
Soviet Union was a much more just place than the United States and were shocked when 
they learned that they were ignorant of the truth.  
 Despite the misconceptions of these two spies, many of the other people who 
spied were in it because of money. Spies Jack Dunlap and Aldrich Ames were extremely 
flashy with the money that they received, which soon became one of the leading 
indicators that someone was involved in espionage.306 However, the era of Cold War 
espionage was not only defined by a different set of motives, but by an increased 
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importance of the information that was given over to the Soviet Union. While many of 
these spies still handed over secrets about American military capacity, some of the spies 
began to give details on Americans spying in the Soviet Union. Aldrich Ames and Robert 
Hanssen each sent as many as ten men to their deaths because of their own selfish greed. 
The spying that occurred during both World War II and the Cold War far 
outranked the espionage of the 1920s and 1930s. The stealing of atomic secrets was an 
egregious crime against the United States and it heightened the tensions between the two 
countries once the war ended.  Nevertheless, the secrets that were transferred during the 
Cold War were also very detrimental to the United States. Not only did this information 
lead to the deaths of some of the America’s highest ranked spies within the Soviet Union, 
but it also dismantled the American Intelligence system at a time of high anxiety, 
especially with the Soviet Union.  
 This spying did not end when the Soviet Union collapsed. Spies like Harold 
James Nicholson began to work within the year after the USSR was no more. Nicholson 
also betrayed the United States because of similar reasons to the Cold War spies. 
Although the Cold War had technically ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
betrayal of information by Americans is still an important issue considering the United 
States influential presence in international politics. The spies of more recent years have 
been in it for reasons of money and ego, which is much different than the spies of the 
1930s and 1940s. Throughout the twenty-first century there have also been SVR agents 
working within the United States: for example, spies like Anna Chapman, Yevgeny 
Buryakov, and Igor Sporyshev all spied for the Russian Federation, but were caught in 
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2010.307  If anything, these arrests are further proof that this cycle of espionage will 
continue on in future years.  
The spying that occurred on America throughout the existence of the Soviet 
Union provides a good example of how complex international relations can be. 
Throughout the many relationships that the Soviet Union and the United States have had 
(through their economic and wartime allegiance to their standoff during the Cold War), 
spying on one another was always a must. However, depending on when the spy was 
collecting information the importance of what they collected changed. For example, what 
the spies gave to the Soviet Union before World War II was of much less importance than 
what the Cold War spies gave to the USSR because it was truly detrimental to the safety 
of American lives. While Soviet spying on the United States explains where much of the 
tension and fear came from during the Cold War, it also made the American 
counterintelligence system improve itself. Spying will always exist because it is the most 
effective way for a country to prepare against an unforeseen attack. Unfortunately, this 
fact is extremely clear after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The role of 
espionage continues to heighten as increased technology allows for countries to access 
even deeper into their enemies’ defenses. No matter who the spy is or when they are 
active, they all understand that information is power.  
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